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Abstract
Most narratives on compulsory licensing of patented drugs typically present a
chasm between two competing groups of stakeholders—on one end are the generic
drug manufacturers who extol compulsory patent licensing as a viable means for
facilitating the production of affordably priced life-saving generic drugs, and on the
other end are the patented drug manufacturers who frown upon such generic drugs
as mere copycats impinging innovation and development. Set in the backdrop of a
curious paradox underlined by India’s ailing healthcare sector but a thriving
pharmaceutical industry, this paper chronicles the country’s past and continuing
experience with compulsory licensing of patented drugs. It presents a comprehensive
discussion on the existing international and domestic statutory framework for the
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India, and also determines the extent
to which the domestic law of the country is compliant with the international law
with regards to the compulsory licensing of patented drugs. It analyzes the key
arguments and findings in Bayer v. Natco, a landmark precedent involving the
issuance of India’s first compulsory license for Nexavar, a patented life-enhancing
drug prescribed in the treatment of certain types of advanced cancers. In light of the
conflicting stakes involved, this paper finally concludes by suggesting “middle path”
strategies for balancing pharmaceutical innovation and access to healthcare in the
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India.

I.

Introduction

India ranks second amongst the most populous countries of the world,1 with a
socio-economic fabric acutely fraught with unequal distribution of healthcare
resources.2
Amongst the various impediments stifling the growth of India’s
health sector is the rise in infectious and chronic diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
dengue, and tuberculosis.3 This proliferation of diseases is attributable to a host of

1.

2.
3.
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paper would not have materialized without the support and encouragement of Kanishka Bhutani.
The World Factbook, as of July 2014, records India’s population as 1, 236, 344, 631, placing it
second in rank to China with a population of 1,355,692,576. The World Factbook, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/
2119rank.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015).
Ashok Vikhe Patil et al., Current Health Scenario in Rural India, 10 AUST. J. RURAL HEALTH 129,
129 (2002) (“About 75% of health infrastructure, medical man power and other health resources
are concentrated in urban areas where 27% of the [Indian] population live.”).
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HEALTHCARE IN INDIA: EMERGING MARKET REPORT 2007 3 (2007),
available at http://storage.globalcitizen.net/data/topic/knowledge/uploads/2009121892144290.pdf
(“[S]ome communicable diseases once thought to be under control, such as dengue fever, viral
hepatitis, tuberculosis, malaria, and pneumonia, have returned in force or have developed a
stubborn resistance to drugs.”).
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circumstances, viz. inequitable access to affordable healthcare,4 poor living and
conditions and lack of hygiene,5 meagre supply of adequate vaccines,6 shortage of
doctors and other medical professionals,7 and unhealthy food and lifestyle.8
Despite the implementation of various government-funded health insurance
programs and schemes,9 the failure of the Indian government to finance adequate
healthcare facilities is laid bare by its own official data on record,10 which reveals
that a large number of people in India fund their health needs through out-ofpocket expenses.11

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

ISABELLE JOUMARD & ANKIT KUMAR, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, IMPROVING HEALTH OUTCOMES AND HEALTH CARE IN INDIA 9 tbl.1,
ECO/WKP(2015)2 (Economics Dep’t Working Paper No. 1184, Jan. 8, 2015), available at
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP%282015%292
&docLanguage=En (reporting the findings of a 2014 survey conducted by the Credit Suisse
Research Institute, which revealed that only 16% of the households in India have access to free or
partially free public health care).
Id. at 7 (“Most [Indian] households in rural areas do not defecate in a toilet or latrine . . . which
leads to infant and child diseases (such as diarrhoea) and can account for much of the variation in
average child height.”).
Id. (“Vaccination rates for diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis, for measles and for hepatitis B are
all much lower [in India] than in OECD and peer countries.”).
Id. at 9 (reporting the findings of a 2012 survey conducted by the Ministry of Health & Family
Welfare, which revealed that “10% of primary health care centres are without a doctor, 37% are
without a laboratory technician and 25% without a pharmacist”).
Nirmalya Dutta, What Ails India’s Healthcare System, THE HEALTHSITE (Aug. 18, 2012, 8:50
AM),
http://www.thehealthsite.com/diseases-conditions/what-ails-indias-healthcare-system/
(“While rural India battles third world diseases like malaria and dengue, rising urbanisation has
led to the middle and upper classes being afflicted with ‘developed world’ lifestyle diseases like
diabetes and obesity. A fast food culture, increased smoking and alcohol consumption has led to a
rise in obesity related diseases like diabetes and cardiovascular ailments.”).
See generally PUBLIC HEALTH FOUNDATION OF INDIA, A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTING
HEALTH INSURANCE MODELS IN INDIA 23-39 (Jan. 31, 2011), (explaining the key features of the
government-funded health insurance schemes in India).
NATIONAL RURAL HEALTH MISSION, MISSION DOCUMENT 3 (2005-2012) (reporting that the Union
(federal) government’s budgetary allocation for public healthcare was 1.3%, while the states’
budgetary allocation was 5.5% during 2005-12) [hereinafter MISSION DOCUMENT]. See also
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD HEALTH STATISTICS
2014: HOW DOES INDIA COMPARE? 1 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Briefing-NoteINDIA-2014.pdf (reporting that the “[t]otal health spending accounted for only 4.0% of GDP in
India in 2012, less than half the OECD average of 9.3%,” and that “India ranks well below the
OECD average in terms of health expenditure per capita, with spending of only USD 157 in
2012 . . ., compared with an OECD average of USD 3484”).
MONEER ALAM & R.P. TYAGI, INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, POPULATION RESEARCH CENTRE,
A STUDY OF OUT OF POCKET HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON DRUGS AND MEDICAL SERVICES: AN
EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF UP, RAJASTHAN AND DELHI XIX (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/reports/sereport/ser/ser_drug2910.pdf (“[A]lmost a fifth
(18.5%) of the rural households and over a tenth (11.6%) of the urban households [in India] spend
more than a quarter of their total consumption budget on health care.”). See also MISSION
DOCUMENT, supra note 10, at 3 (reporting that people hospitalized in India during 2005-2012
spent around 58% of their total annual expenditure, and that over 40% of such people borrowed
heavily or sold their assets to cover their medical expenses).
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A rather conspicuous paradox to India’s ailing state of healthcare is the
country’s fast-emerging pharmaceutical sector, which appears to be broadly
segregated into major groups, namely (a) multinational pharmaceutical
corporations or pharmaceutical MNCs, and (b) domestic pharmaceutical
corporations.12 While the domestic pharmaceutical corporations are “entirely
India-owned,”13 the pharmaceutical MNCs operate in India through subsidiaries
and “conduct varying degrees of drug manufacturing” and research within the
country.14
A cottage industry of studies indicates that the domestic
pharmaceutical corporations in India dominate in their presence over the
pharmaceutical MNCs by commanding the lion’s share of the country’s
pharmaceutical market.15 These domestic pharmaceutical corporations can be
further segmented into two sub-groups—one composed of corporations that engage
in original research and development (R&D) along with the manufacturing of
“generic drugs,”16 and another consisting of small pharmaceutical companies
that only reverse-engineer patented drugs or those that have gone off-patent.17
Both the R&D-engaging domestic pharmaceutical corporations as well as those
that solely manufacture generic drugs rely on compulsory licensing provisions under
the India’s existing domestic and international patent laws to manufacture and export
generic copies of patented life-saving drugs at highly subsidized rates.18
This paper is a doctrinal study focusing on the enforcement of compulsory
licensing of patented drugs in India. Part II opens with a monologue chronicling
the country’s past and continuing experience with the compulsory licensing of
patented drugs, beginning from the days when India had developed notoriety as a
“pirate” nation for copying drugs patented in other countries,19 until today, when it
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.
18.
19.
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Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 532-42 (2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=923538.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533-34.
See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, INDIA EMERGING: PHARMA’S EVOLVING BUSINESS MODELS 24 fig.19
(2011) (indicating that MNCs operating in India hold a modicum 28% share of the country’s
pharmaceutical market, while the remaining 72% share is held by the country’s domestic
pharmaceutical corporations).
Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
informationondrugs/ucm079436.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (“A generic drug is the same as a
brand name drug in dosage, safety, strength, how it is taken, quality, performance, and intended
use. . . . By law, a generic drug product must contain the identical amounts of the same active
ingredient(s) as the brand name product. Drug products evaluated as "therapeutically equivalent"
can be expected to have equal effect and no difference when substituted for the brand name
product.”).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 536-37.
See discussion infra Part III.A-B(analyzing the statutory provisions for the enforcement of
compulsory patent licensing under the existing domestic and international patent laws of India)
Mueller, supra note 12, at 514.
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has earned respect from the international community for becoming the “pharmacy
of the developing world.”20 Part III, thereafter, presents a comprehensive
discussion on the international and domestic statutory framework for the
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing in India, and also determines the
extent to which the domestic law of the country is compliant with the international
law with regards to the compulsory licensing of patented drugs. Part IV attempts
to collate the conflicting perspectives of the various stakeholders of compulsory
patent licensing in the famous Bayer v. Natco case involving the issuance of India’s
first compulsory license for a life-enhancing patented drug. Part V concludes by
suggesting plausible “middle-path” strategies for the effective enforcement of
compulsory licensing of patented drugs in India.

II. Chronicling the History of Compulsory Licensing of
Patented Drugs in India
A. Meaning and Essentials of a Compulsory Patent License
A compulsory license is a government-enforced contract authorizing a generic
drug manufacturer to manufacture and use a patented invention for a stipulated
sum of compensation to the patentee of the invention.21 Such government or thirdparty use of a patented invention is typically non-commercial in nature,22 and is
needed in order to address a national need or to remedy an anti-competitive
practice.23 Unlike a voluntary contract where there is consensus ad idem,24 the
terms and conditions of a compulsory license are not mutually agreed upon by the
20.
21.

22.

23.

24.

Simon Reid-Henry & Hans Lofgren, Pharmaceutical Companies Putting Health of World’s Poor at
Risk, THE GUARDIAN (July 26, 2012, 2:00 EDT), http://www.theguardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/ 2012/jul/26/pharmaceutical-companies-health-worlds-poor-risk.
Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in
PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004), available at
https://www.law.ou.edu/faculty/facfiles/Ragavan-Final-Richmond.pdf (“Compulsory licenses [are
defined] as involuntary contract[s] between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and
enforced by the state.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs
at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 857-58 (2003) (“Compulsory Licenses are generally defined as
authorizations permitting a third party to make, use, or sell a patented invention without the
patent owner’s consent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
For a discussion on the non-commercial use of patented drugs through compulsory licensing, see
generally Pier DeRoo, Public Non-Commercial Use’ Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical
Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 347 (2011), available at
http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol32/iss2/3/.
Chien, supra note 21, at 859 (“While specific provisions vary, compulsory licenses are
generally authorized in the event of undesirable behavior by the patentee, such as anticompetitive, non-working, or blocking behaviour; in the event of ‘public need,’ such as
government infringement or national emergency; or in the context of food and drugs.”).
JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 63 (2014).
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licensor and the licensee, but are imposed on them by the government.25 Further,
the government that grants a compulsory license can also revoke or terminate it if
the circumstances that led to the issuance of such a license cease to exist.26
B. Historical Overview of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India
In 1947, when India transitioned from an English colony to a sovereign
democracy, the country’s patent regime continued to be governed by the Britishenacted Indian Patents and Designs Act of 1911,27 which permitted the patenting
of pharmaceutical products.28 This, resultantly, barred the manufacturing of
generic copies of patented drugs in India. The availability and supply of patented
drugs, therefore, was largely controlled by pharmaceutical MNCs, who mostly
imported them into India and sold them locally at exorbitant prices.29 The
unreasonably high pricing of patented drugs made them inaccessible to most in
India, thus precipitating the need for providing a legitimate means for domestic
pharmaceutical corporations to manufacture and sell generic copies of patented
drugs at affordable prices within the country.30
The Government of India, by a resolution dated January 10, 1948, appointed
Justice (Dr.) Bakshi Tek Chand, a retired judge of Lahore High Court, to chair the
Patents Enquiry Committee (1948–50), whose report published in 1950
recommended provisions for enabling compulsory licensing “to counteract the
misuse or abuse of patent monopolies in India.”31 Based on the recommendations
of this report, the Patents Act of 1911 was amended, first in 195032 and

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, 8 NW. J. INTI’L L. & BUS. 666, 667 (1987-1988) (“In compulsory licensing situations a
court dictates the terms of the license, and the licensor’s wishes may be ignored.”).
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating
the Options, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 252-53 (2009).
The Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, Act No. 2 of 1911, INDIA CODE (1911) available at
http://www.theindianlawyer.in/statutesnbareacts/acts/d42.html [hereinafter Patents Act of 1911].
Mueller, supra note 12, at 508.
Id. at 509-10. See also Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Unequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273, 280 (2006) (citing the findings of a 1961 U.S. Senate Committee report
to emphasize that “Indian drug prices ranked among the highest in the world”).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 510.
SHRI JUSTICE N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE PATENTS LAW 3 (Sept.
1959), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/201678355/Ayyangar-Committee-Report#scribd
[hereinafter AYYANGAR REPORT].
Mueller, supra note 12, at 511. See also THE PATENT OFFICE, INDIA, DRAFT MANUAL OF PATENT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 (3rd ed. 2008), [hereinafter DRAFT MPP]. Pursuant to the 1950
amendment to the Patents Act of 1911, an application for a compulsory patent license could be
filed on the following grounds, namely: (a) that the patented invention was not being commercially
worked to its fullest extent in India; (b) that the demand for the patented invention in India was
not being met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms; (c) that the importation of the
patented invention was hindering its commercial working in India; (d) that the refusal of the
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subsequently in 1952,33 to incorporate a framework for enforcing compulsory
patent licensing in India.34 Despite the incorporation of compulsory patent
licensing in the Patents Act of 1911, these provisions were rarely invoked due to
the adversarial nature and high cost of litigation involved in deciding compulsory
patent license applications.35
As the compulsory patent licensing provisions under the Patents Act of 1911
were rarely invoked, a need was felt to craft a more robust patent law system in
the country. Towards this end, in 1957, the Government of India appointed Justice
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, the then sitting judge of the Madras High Court, to chair

33.

34.

35.

patentee of the patented invention to voluntarily license his invention were hindering its
commercial or industrial working in India; (e) that a market for the export of the patented
invention manufactured in India was not being supplied; (f) that the working of any other
patented invention that substantially contributed to the establishment or development of
commercial or industrial activities in India was being unfairly prejudiced; and (g) that the
conditions imposed by a patentee while licensing his patented invention were unfairly prejudicing
the establishment or development of commercial or industrial activities in India. Id.
Mueller, supra note 12, at 511. See also DRAFT MPP, supra note 32, at 9-10 (reporting that the
1952 amendment to the Patents Act of 1911 resulted in providing a mechanism for issuing compulsory patent licenses for food and medicines, insecticide, germicide or fungicide, or surgical or
curative devices, and further, that such compulsory licenses could also be issued upon a notification by the Central (federal) Government in India).
Aside from the 1950 and 1952 amendments to the Patents Act of 1911, the recommendations of
the Tek Chand Committee Report were also instrumental in the introduction of a patent reforms
bill in in the Parliament (India’s federal legislature) in 1953. This bill, however, lapsed due the
dissolution of one of the houses of the Parliament. DRAFT MPP, supra note 32, at 10.
See Mueller, supra note 12, at 511 (explaining that compulsory licenses under the Patents Act of
1911 were “rarely sought” because “patent owners retained the right to oppose the grant of such
licenses and to appeal any such grants”). See also SUDIP CHAUDHURI, INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
MANAGEMENT CALCUTTA, TRIPS AND CHANGES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT REGIME IN INDIA 29
(Working Paper No. 535, Jan. 2005) (documenting the empirical findings of an earlier study
conducted by the author in 1984, which revealed that due to “the hazards of obtaining a
compulsory license,” including “legal battles,” only five compulsory license applications were
submitted until 1970, of which two were allowed, one was refused, and the remaining two were
withdrawn). See also SHAMNAD BASHEER & MRINALINI KOCHUPILLAI, THE ‘COMPULSORY LICENSE’
REGIME IN INDIA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: A REPORT FOR THE JPO 1 (2005) (reporting without
citation to authority two cases allowing the grant of a compulsory patent license under the
Patents Act of 1911). One of the cases that allowed the compulsory license application was
Raptakos, Brett & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Benger Laboratories Ltd., which was decided on July 28, 1950,
and ruled, inter alia, that the patentee’s anticipated reduction in the price of its patented drug
was not a valid opposition, and therefore, not a sufficient ground for refusing the grant of
compulsory license to the applicant, especially when such license was being sought by the
applicant for making generic copies of the patentee’s therapeutic drug available to the public at a
reasonably affordable price.. Id. at 40-41. The second case that allowed a compulsory license
application was NeoPharma Industries (P) Ltd. v. Parke Davis & Co., which was decided on
November 23, 1965, and clarified, inter alia, that the admissibility requirements for an
application filed under the Patents Act of 1911, seeking a compulsory license for a patented drug,
did not require the applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the
patentee of the drug. Id. at 42-43.
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the Patents Revision Committee (1957–59),36 whose report published in 1959
proposed “radical modifications” that went on to “form the backbone of the Indian
patent system.”37
Notably, the Ayyangar Report premised its “radical
modifications” on the following “three-pronged strategy”: first, identifying the types
of inventions for which patent protection should be available; second, determining
either to prohibit the granting of Indian patents to foreign entities or to require the
working of such patents in India; and third, determining whether or not to
withstand international pressures on India to join the prevailing international
intellectual property conventions.38
The Ayyangar Report’s far-reaching
modifications led to the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970,39 which thereby
repealed the Patents Act of 1911.40
The most notable features of the Patents Act of 1970 were its provisions
revoking the patentability of pharmaceutical products in India.41 Section 5 of the
Patents Act of 1970, while prohibiting patents on “substances intended for use, or
capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug,”42 permitted patents on
processes for making pharmaceutical compounds.43 As the Patents Act of 1970
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
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AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 31, at 4. See also JAKKRIT KUANPOTH, PATENT RIGHTS IN
PHARMACEUTICALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 46 (2010).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 511-12 (explaining that the Ayyangar Report’s proposed “radical
modifications” to then existing patent laws of India were aimed towards accommodating the
nation’s “ fledgling technological advancement and industrialization, the need to encourage and
reward inventors, and the increasing number of Indian research institutes and emphasis on
technical education ”). See also Ragavan, supra note 29, at 281 n.53 (“The Ayyangar Report, as
modified by the Report of the Joint Committee of Parliament in 1966, forms the backbone of the
Indian patent system.”). See generally AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 31, at 1-354.
Mueller, supra note 12, at 512.
The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (1970) [hereinafter Patents Act of 1970].
Id. § 162(1) (“The Indian Patents and Designs Act, 1911, in so far as it relates to patents, is hereby
repealed . . . .”).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 512. See also Linda L. Lee, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent
Law and Novartis AG v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 290-91 (2008). See also
Ragavan, supra note 29, at 285 (explaining that the Ayyangar Committee’s proposed modification
to revoke the patentability of food and pharmaceuticals, which was eventually incorporated into
the Patents Act of 1970, was justified because vesting product patents in food and
pharmaceuticals could deny vast sections of India’s population access to such products, thereby
violating their constitutional right to life and good health).
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 5(a)-(b). Please note that section 5 was eventually omitted
when the Patents Act of 1970 was amended in 2005 to enable the patenting of pharmaceutical
products in India. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
See id. § 5(b) (“[N]o patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances [intended for
use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicine or drug] . . . , but claims for the methods or
processes of manufacture shall be patentable.”) (emphasis added). See also Mueller, supra note 12,
at 513 (“The Patents Act, 1970, also included expansive compulsory licensing provisions, such that
patented processes for manufacturing substances capable of being used as medicine or food were
deemed automatically endorsed with the designation licenses of right.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See id. at 513 n.114 (citing examples of patented processes that were deemed to be
endorsed as “licenses of right,” such as Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Controller Gen. of Patents,
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expressly restricted pharmaceutical products from being patented, the years that
followed saw an acute proliferation of domestic pharmaceutical corporations in
India,44 making the country a leading producer of low-cost generic drugs in the
world.45
For more than two decades after the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970,
India conscientiously refrained from swearing allegiance to the then prevailing
international intellectual property (IP) instruments in order to ward off
potentially huge IP costs that the developed countries of the world could impose
on its domestic market.46 In fact, during the first three years of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,47 India stoutly opposed the
inclusion of IP protection within the GATT framework.48 Later, however, due to
an economic slowdown in the late 1980s, India reversed its anti-IP stance.49
Fearing trade barriers to its exports, withdrawal of textile tariff concessions,
suspension of economic aid, etc., India signed the Trade-Related Aspects of

44.

45.

46.
47.

48.
49.

1987 A.I.R. 77 (Calcutta H.C.), which affirmed the Controller of Patents’ order deeming the
patentee-appellant’s patent—a catalyst useful in hydrocarbon reforming as well as a process for
making the catalyst—to be subject to licensing of right).
See YUSUF K. HAMEID, INDIAN PHARMA INDUSTRY: DECADES OF STRUGGLE AND ACHIEVEMENT 5
(Apr. 2005) (observing that MNCs had controlled over 70% of the pharmaceutical market in India,
but following the enactment of the Patents Act of 1970, the market share of MNCs fell below
23%). Notably, the lack of patent protection to pharmaceutical products resulted in
pharmaceutical MNCs restricting their business in India. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 513-14
(“By fiscal year (FY) 1978-79, the number of foreign-owned patent applications filed in India had
decreased to 1,010, less than one quarter of the 4,248 applications filed by non-Indians ten years
prior in 1968.”).
Drug prices in India plummeted to an all-time low following the enactment of the Patents Act of
1970. Mueller, supra note 12, at 514 (“The eventual economic effect of the India Patents Act, 1970,
was a dramatic increase in domestic generic drug manufacturing and a sharp decline in the price
of medicines sold in India. Pharmaceutical products patented outside of India could be freely
copied in India under the Act, so long as the process by which they were produced did not infringe
an Indian process patent . . . .”). See also id. at 515 (“For example, the price in 1998 of the Indian
equivalent of ranitidine, the active ingredient in Glaxo’s Zantac anti-ulcer medicine, was over 100
times less than the price of Zantac on the U.S. market.”).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 512 (“By holding out against membership in the prevailing
international IP conventions, India hoped to develop its economy independently without armtwisting from developed nations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT began in 1947 with the objective of re-structuring and
streamlining multi-lateral economic relations between its member countries. The Uruguay
Round, formally launched in the September of 1986 at Punta del Este, Uruguay, was the 8th
round of multi-trade negotiations conducted within the framework of the GATT, with the
objective to enlarge the scope of trade negotiations to include areas such as IP and trade in
services, and to reform trade in agriculture and textiles. For an overview of the Uruguay Round
of the GATT and its implications for developing countries, see generally WAYNE SANDIFORD,
GATT AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1-8 (Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 1994).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 517.
Id. at 517-518.
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement on April 15, 199450, and
subsequently, on January 1, 1995, it became a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).51
Since India did not have a system of affording patent protection to
pharmaceutical products at the time it joined the WTO, it was granted a ten year
transition period—from January 1, 1995 to January 1, 2005—to bring its domestic
intellectual property law in line with the TRIPS Agreement.52 Consequently,
the Patents Act of 1970 was amended in three phases: first, in 1999, to introduce
a “mailbox facility”53 and to allow for “exclusive marketing rights (EMRs);”54
second, in 2002, to modify India’s domestic provisions on the enforcement of
compulsory patent licensing,55 to abolish the system of “licenses of rights,”56 and to

50.
51.

52.
53.

54.

55.
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Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results
of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
Mueller, supra note 12, at 518. For a cursory understanding the WTO and how it replaced the
GATT as an international organization, see generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
INFORMATION AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIVISION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9-21 (5th ed.
2015).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 518-19. See also id. at 518 (“India is viewed as the nation primarily
responsible for the TRIPS’ multi-year transition periods, which the multinational pharmaceutical
industry had vociferously opposed.”).
See The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999, § 2, INDIA CODE (1999), available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.pdf (inserting § 5(2) into the Patents Act of 1970 for
introducing provisions with respect to the “mailbox facility”) [hereinafter Patents
(Amendment) Act of 1999]. The “mailbox facility” was a stop-gap arrangement wherein each
pharmaceutical product patent application that was filed in India during the ten year
transitional period afforded under the TRIPS Agreement—from January 1, 1995 to January 1,
2005—was put into a symbolic “black box” and assigned a filing date. See Mueller, supra note
12, at 519-22. Thus, as pharmaceutical product patenting was not in force during India’s
transitional period between 1995 and 2005, the mailbox facility provided a “pipeline
protection” of sorts to pharmaceutical product patent applications that were filed but could
not be taken up for examination during this period. See id. at 519-20.
Patents (Amendment) Act of 1999, supra note 53, § 3 (inserting Chapter IVA into the Patents Act
of 1970, containing provisions with respect to exclusive marketing rights). A select category of
mailbox applicants, who met the requirements of § 24(B)(1) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of
1999, qualified for the grant of exclusive marketing rights (EMRs). See Mueller, supra note 12, at
525. An EMR, if conferred, afforded the mailbox applicant an exclusive right to sell or distribute
his invention in India for a period of five years from the date on which such right was conferred
until such time the mailbox application was allowed and the patent was granted, or until the
mailbox application was finally rejected, whichever was earlier. Id.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 38 of 2002, § 39, INDIA CODE (2002), available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patentg.pdf (modifying Chapter XVI of the Patents Act of 1970 to
introduce more grounds for enforcing compulsory patent licensing) [hereinafter Patents
(Amendment) Act of 2002]. Pursuant to section 39 of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, the
following three grounds for issuing a compulsory license under the Patents Act of 1970 were
introduced, namely: (a) to prevent the abuse of patent rights resulting from the non-working of a
patent, (b) to address cases of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for the purposes of a
public non-commercial use, and (c) to work any other related patent. Id. For a detailed analysis of
these grounds and how they are currently enforced under the Patents Act of 1970, see discussion
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formally recognize India’s accession to United Nations’ affiliate World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO)57 administered Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property58 as well as Patent Cooperation Treaty,59 and third, in 2005,
(a) to extend patent protection to products such as food, drugs, chemicals, and
micro-organisms,60 (b) to introduce compulsory license provisions for enabling the
export of generic copies of pharmaceutical patented products to countries with no
or insufficient manufacturing capacity for such products,61 and (c) to introduce
reforms to the “new invention,” “inventive step,” and “new use exclusion” criteria of
patentability.62 These three-phases of amendments to the Patents Act of 1970
paved the way for a piecemeal implementation of pharmaceutical product
patenting in India, which consequently resulted in precluding generic drug
manufacturers in the country from manufacturing generic copies of patented

56.

57.
58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

infra Part III.B.
Under section 87 of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 1999, process patents on food and medicines
were automatically deemed to be endorsed as “licenses of right,” thus making them available for
compulsory licensing three years after the grant of the patent. However, pursuant to section 39 of
the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, the system of “license of right” was abolished. See V.K.
Unni, Indian Patent Law and TRIPS: Redrawing the Flexibility Framework in the Context of
Public Policy and Health, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 323, 334 & n.117 (2012).
For an overview on the WIPO and how it operates in the international IP arena, see generally
WIPO, About WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited June 30, 2015).
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The Paris Convention came into force in India on December 7, 1998, effective which date the country became obligated to comply with its principles concerning—(a) national treatment, which forbids discriminatory treatment of foreign patent applications), and (b)
right of priority, which allows foreign applicants, who have previously filed patent applications in
their home countries, with a twelve-month priority period to file a patent application for the same
invention in India while retaining the benefit of their earlier home country filing date. See
Mueller, supra note 12, at 527.
Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf [hereinafter PCT]. The PCT came into force in India
on December 7, 1998, effective which date India began accepting national phase filings of international patent applications originally filed abroad. See Mueller, supra note 12, at 527.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 4, INDIA CODE (2005), available at
http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf (omitting section 5 of the Patents Act of 1970,
thus bringing an end to the restrictions on food and pharmaceutical product patenting in
India)[hereinafter Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005].
Id. § 55 (inserting Section 92A into the Patents Act of 1970 for allowing, through compulsory
patent licensing, the export of generic copies pharmaceutical patented products to countries with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such products). For understanding the requirements
of filing a compulsory patent license application under section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970, see
discussion infra Part III.B.1.d.
The Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, supra note 60, §§ 2(f)-3(d) (modifying the definitions of
“inventive step,” “new invention,” and “new use exclusion”). For a detailed analysis of the “new
invention,” “inventive step,” and “new use exclusion” criteria of patentability under the Patents
(Amendment) Act of 2005, see generally Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, 1 THE INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 15, 20-25 (2005).
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drugs, except by way of obtaining either a voluntary or a compulsory license in
respect of such drugs.

III. International and Domestic Statutory-Framework for the
Enforcement of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India
A. Enforcement of Compulsory Licensing of Patented Drugs under
the TRIPS Agreement
Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement, inter alia, lays out a framework of
substantive and procedural provisions for the enforcement of compulsory
licensing.63 Although the expression “compulsory license” is not used anywhere in
section 5, it’s concept and application is implicit in the “limited exceptions” to
patent protection under article 30, 64 and is further implicit in the caption of article
31 titled as “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder.”65 Article 31,
at its very outset, states that a compulsory license for a patented invention may be
issued to a private entity or the government, or to a third party authorized by the
government.66 A private entity intending to obtain a compulsory license should
have “made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions,”67 and such efforts should not have been
successful within a reasonable period of time.68 Notably, the requirement for a
compulsory license applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary
license from the patentee of an invention is dispensed with in situations of a
national emergency or an extreme urgency,69 or for purposes of a public noncommercial use,70 or for remedying anti-competitive practices.71 Moreover, a
compulsory license may also be sought to work a related (second) patent, which
cannot be worked without infringing an already existing (first) patent.72
63.
64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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For a quick reference of the precise grounds on which a compulsory license may be granted under
the TRIPS Agreement, see infra Annexure I.A.
Chien, supra note 21, at 870 (“Article 30 authorizes general exceptions to patent protection, presumably including compulsory licensing, but states that these exceptions must neither unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent nor unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 869-70 (stating that compulsory licensing is implicit in Article 31’s title, “Other Use Without
Authorization of the Right Holder,” in that “[t]his provision permits WTO member countries to
authorize compulsory licenses for use by the government or third parties subject to certain
restrictions”).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31.
Id. art. 31(b).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 31(k).
Id. art. 31(l).However, the grant of a compulsory license to work a (second) related patent is
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Given that a compulsory license is contractual in nature, albeit imposed, it is
enforced through a set of terms and conditions spelled out in Article 31,73 which
include: first, that the authorized use of a patented invention through compulsory
licensing should be non-exclusive;74 second, that such use should be nonassignable;75 third, that such use should be predominantly for the supply of the
licensee’s domestic market,76 except where such use is permitted to remedy an
anti-competitive practice, in which case the licensee is permitted to manufacture
and export generic copies of the patented invention to foreign markets;77 fourth,
that the patentee should be paid adequate remuneration, taking into account the
economic value of the authorization;”78 fifth, that the scope and duration of the
authorized use should be limited to the purpose for which it is authorized,
particularly in the case of semi-conductor technology, where the licensee must
work the patented invention only for a public non-commercial use or to remedy an
anti-competitive practice;79 and sixth, that such use shall be “terminated if and
when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”80
Further, article 31 directs the competent authority, deciding on the authorization
of such use, to consider each request on its individual merits.81 Finally, the
decision of the competent authority, allowing or dismissing the authorization of
such use, including its decision on the quantum of remuneration payable to the
patentee, shall not be final but subject to judicial review by a higher authority.82
Notably, there are vital public health underpinnings to the enforcement of
compulsory patent licensing, which come to the fore when articles 30 and 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement, are read in conjunction with articles 8 and 27 therein, and are

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

subject to the following three pre-conditions: first, that the related (second) patent shall involve an
important technical advancement of considerable economic significance in relation to the already
existing (first) patent; second, that the patentee of the already existing (first) patent shall be
entitled, on reasonable terms, to a “cross-license” to use the related (second) patent; and third,
that the compulsory license granted in respect of the already existing (first) patent shall be nonassignable except with the assignment of the related (second) patent. Id. art. 31(l)(i)-(iii).
For a quick reference of the precise terms and conditions subject to which a compulsory patent
license may be granted under the TRIPS Agreement, see infra Annexure I.B.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31(d).
Id. art. 31(e).
Id. art. 31(f).
See id. art. 31(k). Article 31(k), therefore, creates an exception to article 31(f), which otherwise limits the authorized use of a patented invention to predominantly supplying the domestic market.
See id. art. 31(k) read with art. 31(f). See also Chien, supra note 21, at 870 (“[U]nless the patentee
has engaged in anti-competitive behavior, the [authorized] use [of a patented invention through
compulsory licensing] must predominantly supply the domestic market.”).
Id. art. 31(h).
Id. art. 31(c).
Id. art. 31(g).
Id. art. 31(a).
See id. art. 31(i) read with art. 31(j).
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further read with paragraphs 5(c) and 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health.83 While article 8 states that “[m]embers may . . .
adopt measures necessary to protect public health,”84 article 27 allows member
countries to exclude from patentability such inventions that aid in the protection of
public health.85 Further, paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration interprets “a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,” as stated in
article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, to be a public health crisis relating to
“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”86 Furthermore, the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health87 makes provision for allowing member countries to export a
patented drug, which has been manufactured or imported under a compulsory
license, to other countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for such
drug.88 It would, therefore, not be anomalous to state that articles 30 and 31 of the
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.

88.
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World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl
_trips_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 50, art. 8.
Id. art. 27(2).
Doha Declaration, supra note 83, ¶ 5(c). Paragraph 5(c), by necessary implication, also states that
its interpretation of what can represent “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency” is not exhaustive or restricted to situations of public health crisis alone, in that “[e]ach
member [country] has the right to determine what [generally can] constitute[] a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” in situations under article 31(b) of the
TRIPS Agreement that are outside the purview of public health. See id.
World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003),
available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm [hereinafter
Implementation Decision].
See id. ¶ 6. The Implementation Decision creates an exception to article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement, which otherwise limits the authorized use of a patented invention to predominantly
supplying the domestic market. See id. ¶ 6 read with ¶ 2. See also Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS,
Patents and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
211, 213-14 (2004), (“Paragraph 6 [of the Implementation Decision] . . . by creating an exception to
[a]rticle 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement . . . allows nations with insufficient or no manufacturing
capabilities to override intellectual property protection and import generic copies of patented
drugs to combat public health crisis.”). Further, the use of compulsory patent licensing in terms of
the Implementation Decision is subject to certain obligations which both the importing member
and the exporting member must meet. Such obligations include, among others, that the importing
member must make a notification to the General Council in the following terms: (a) confirming
that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the patented drug required to address its
public health problem; (b) specifying the names and expected quantities of the patented drug it
seeks to import in order to address its public health problem; and (c) that it has granted a
compulsory license for the patented drug it seeks to import. See Implementation Decision, supra
note 87, ¶ 2(a)(i)-(iii). In similar vein, the exporting member’s obligations include, among others,
the following: (a) to specify the quantum of the generic copies of the patented drug that it would
manufacture and export under the compulsory license; (b) to specially label or mark such copies of
the drug; and (c) to notify, by way of a posting on its website or by any other means of publication,
any information about the export of such copies of the patented drug. See id. ¶ 2(b)(i)-(iii).
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TRIPS Agreement, when read with articles 8 and 27 therein, and when further
read with paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration and paragraph 6 of the
Implementation Decision, have the effect of creating a binding bridge between the
TRIPS Agreement and the concept of public health.89
B. Enforcement of Compulsory Licensing of Patented Drugs under
the Patents Act of 1970
1. Grounds for Issuing a Compulsory Patent License
An application seeking a compulsory license for a patented drug must first be
filed at the Office of the Controller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks
(hereinafter “Controller of Patents”), who is the statutory authority of first instance
for the adjudication of proceedings pertaining to compulsory licensing in India.90
Further, applicants seeking a compulsory patent license under the framework of
the Patents Act of 1970 are typically India’s domestic pharmaceutical corporations,
primarily engaged in the manufacturing of generic drugs, though an application
for a compulsory patent license can also be filed by the Central (federal)
Government of India.91
The various grounds on which a compulsory license for a patented drug may be
granted are encapsulated in Chapter XVI, sections 82 through 94, of the Patents
Act of 1970.92 Broadly speaking, there are four such grounds: first, to prevent the
abuse of patent rights;93 second, to work a related patent;94 third, to address cases

89.
90.

91.

92.
93.
94.

See Chien, supra note 21, at 870-71 (“While [a]rticles 30 and 31 apply to patents in all fields,
[a]rticles 8 and 27, as well as the Doha Declaration . . ., explicitly address the relationship
between TRIPS and public health.”).
The Office of the Controller of Patents, a subordinate office under the Department of Industrial
Policy and Promotion of the Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry, administers laws and
regulations relating to intellectual property rights in India. See Shamnad Basheer, “Policy Style”
Reasoning at the Indian Patent Office, 3 INTELL. PROP.Q., 309, 319 (2005). See also Mueller, supra
note 12, at 615 (“The Controller [of Patents] has broad powers in deciding whether and on what
terms to grant applications for compulsory licenses . . . . [I]n . . . [compulsory licensing] proceedings
before him under the Patents Act [of 1970,] the Controller [of Patents] has certain powers of a civil
court, including the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and to examine
that person under oath, and to require the discovery and production of documents.”).
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 2(1)(s) (stating that a “person”, seeking a compulsory patent license under the Patents Act of 1970, “includes the Government”). See also The Patents
Rules, 2003, rule 96 (updated 2015), (specifying the procedural requirements for drafting a compulsory patent license application filed by the Central Government in India) [hereinafter Patents
Rules of 2003].
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 82-94. For a quick reference of the precise grounds on
which a compulsory license may be granted under the Patents Act of 1970, see infra Annexure
I.A.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1).
Id. § 91(1).

347

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2015)

of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public noncommercial use;95 and fourth, to export a pharmaceutical patent to a country with
no or insufficient manufacturing capacity.96 These grounds are discussed in depth
in the paragraphs below.
a. To prevent the abuse of patent rights (Section 84):

Section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970 enumerates three specific instances of
abuse of pharmaceutical patent rights: first, that the reasonable requirements of
the public with respect to the patented drug have not been satisfied;97 second, that
the patented drug is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price,98
and third, that the patented drug is not worked in the territory of India.99
Section 84(1)(a), when read with sections 84(4) and 84(7), enumerates the
various circumstances where the reasonable requirements of the public with
respect to a patented drug shall be deemed not to have been satisfied.100 For
instance, “the reasonable requirements of the public shall be deemed not to have
been satisfied” if, on account of the refusal to grant a compulsory license, “an
existing trade or industry or the development thereof or the establishment of any
new trade or industry in India . . . is prejudiced,”101 or “the demand for the
patented article has not been met to an adequate extent or on reasonable terms,”102
or “a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being
supplied or developed,”103 or “the establishment or development of commercial
activities in India is prejudiced.”104 The reasonable requirements of the public
shall further be deemed not to have been satisfied “if, by reason of conditions
imposed by the patentee upon the grant of licenses under the patent or upon the
purchase, hire or use of the patented article or process, . . . the establishment or
development of any trade or industry in India, is prejudiced,”105 or “if the patentee
imposes a condition upon the grant of licenses under the patent to provide
exclusive grant back, prevention to challenges to the validity of [the] patent or
coercive package licensing.”106 Furthermore, the reasonable requirements of the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Id. § 92(1).
Id. § 92A(1).
See id. § 84(1)(a).
See id. § 84(1)(b).
See id. § 84(1)(c).
See id. § 84(7)(a)-(e).
Id. § 84(7)(a)(i).
Id. § 84(7)(a)(ii).
Id. § 84 (7)(a)(iii).
Id. § 84 (7)(a)(iv).
Id. § 84 (7)(b).
Id. § 84 (7)(c).
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public shall be deemed not to have been satisfied if a patented article is not being
worked in India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or to its fullest extent
that is reasonably practicable,107 or if the working of the patented drug on a
commercial scale in India is being hindered by the importation of the patented
article from abroad by the patentee or his agents, or by persons directly indirectly
purchasing from the patentee, or by third parties against whom the patentee has
not enforced the patent.108
According to section 84(1)(b), a compulsory license can also be obtained to
prevent the abuse of a patented drug if such drug is not available to the public at a
reasonably affordable price.109 Section 84 of the Patents Act of 1970 does not make
specific the possible factors that the Controller of Patents must take into
consideration while determining whether or not a patented drug is reasonably
priced.110 Be that as it may, a generic drug manufacturer seeking a compulsory
license under section 84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970 has the burden to prima
facie establish that the patented drug is not reasonably priced;111 for instance, by
providing evidence of the drug prices charged by the patentee in India and then
comparing those prices with the prices charged by the patentee for the same drug
outside of India,112 or by comparing those prices with the prices of the drug’s nonpatented substitutes available in India.113
According to section 84(1)(c), a compulsory license can be obtained to prevent
the abuse of a patented drug if such drug has not been worked in India.114
Although section 84(1)(c) does not define or explain what it means to “work a
patent,” courts in India have broadly interpreted the “working of a patent in India”
to mean that the patented invention is locally manufactured within the territory of
India.115 It is noteworthy that while considering whether or not a patent has been

107.
108.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. § 84 (7)(d). For the meaning of the expression “work a patent,” see infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(7)(e)(i)-(iii). Contra infra note 116 and accompanying
text (highlighting the prevalent judicial trend that considers a patented article imported from
abroad to have been worked in India, provided that the patentee can reasonably justify the
circumstances which prevented him from manufacturing the patented article locally within
India).
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84 (1)(b).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 592.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 87 (1).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 593.
Id.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84 (1)(c).
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. 1323 of 2013, July 15, 2014 (Bombay H.C.), at 48,
available at http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/generatenewauth.php?auth=cGF0aD0uL2RhdGEvan
VkZ2VtZW50cy8yMDE0LyZmbmFtZT1PU1dQMTEyODEzLnBkZiZzbWZsYWc9Tg== (“[W]hen a
patent holder is faced with an application for [c]ompulsory [l]icense, it is for the patent holder to
show that the patented invention / drug is worked in the territory of India by manufacture or
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worked in India, the importation of such patent is also permissible, provided the
patentee can reasonably explain and justify the circumstances that prevented him
from manufacturing it locally within the country.116
As part of the admissibility requirements, a compulsory patent license
application under section 84 can be filed at any time after the expiration of three
years from the date of the grant of the patent,117 and after the applicant has made
efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions,
and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period, not
ordinarily exceeding six months.118 However, the requirement for a compulsory
license applicant to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from
a patentee is dispensed with “in case of national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency or in case of public non-commercial use or on establishment of
a ground of anticompetitive practices adopted by the patentee.”119 Notably, the
specific circumstances resulting in a waiver on the requirement of making initial
efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license, as outlined in the proviso clause to
section 84(6)(iv) of the Patents Act of 1970, are consistent with articles 31(b) and
31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement.120

116.

117.
118.
119.
120.
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otherwise.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Bayer v. Union of India (Decision of the Bombay High
Court)].
Id. at 48-49 (“Manufactur[ing of a patent] . . . may not [always] be necessary to establish [the]
working [of a patent] in India . . . .[W]here a patent holder satisfies the authorities, the reason
why the patented invention could not be manufactured in India [sic] then the patented invention
can be considered as having been worked in the territory in India even by import.”). Notably, the
importation of a patent, as opposed to its local manufacturing in India, may not necessarily be a
viable option for “working the patent” from both business and public health standpoint. See G.B.
Reddy & Harunrashid A. Kadri, Local Working of Patents: Law and Implementation in India, 18
J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 15, 22 (2013) (“Local production [of a patent] ensures price reduction,
increases supply and competition and . . . increases domestic expertise in the production of
medicines for key local diseases, increases transfer of technology and knowledge, increases
employment, opens a new export market and improves foreign exchange flows.”). Nonetheless, the
local manufacturing of a patent is also not always feasible, especially when its importation may be
a better option towards “working the patent” in India. See id. at 23 (“In particular cases, [the] bulk
production of patented goods from an existing plant and importing the goods to the country of
patent grant may be more convenient for the patentee, rather than to establish a new industrial
unit. It saves the start-up costs, manpower, maintenance cost, administrative expenses and other
infrastructural expenses, including electricity, water, etc.”). Therefore, while deciding whether a
patentee should be permitted to work his patent in India through its importation, a “case-to-case”
basis approach is appropriate with each case being decided on its own merits. See Bayer Corp. v.
Union of India (Decision of the Bombay High Court), supra note 115, at 48.
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1).
Id. § 84(6)(iv) read with Explanation Clause to § 84(6)(iv)(stating that “reasonable period” in
section 84(6)(iv) “shall be construed as a period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months”).
Id. Proviso Clause to § 84(6)(iv).
See discussion supra Part III.A (enumerating the specific circumstances stated in articles 31(b)
and 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement, which obviate a compulsory license applicant from making
initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee).
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Once a compulsory patent license application under section 84 is admitted and
published in the official journal by the Controller of Patents, the patentee is duly
notified with a copy of such application, and is provided with a reasonable
opportunity to file his opposition to such application in terms of the procedure laid
down in section 87 of the Patents Act of 1970.121 Further, once the compulsory
license applicant is notified of the patentee’s opposition to his application, and only
after both the applicant and the patentee have been afforded an opportunity to be
heard, that the Controller of Patents decides whether the compulsory license
should be denied or granted.122
b. To work a related patent (Section 91):

Section 91 of the Patents Act of 1970 provides that “any person who has the
right to work any other patented invention either as patentee or as licensee
thereof, . . . may apply . . . [for a compulsory license in respect of an already
existing patent] on the ground that he is prevented or hindered without such
license from working the other invention efficiently or to the best advantage
possible.”123 This ground for issuing a compulsory license is invoked to “alleviate
the situation of blocking of patents,” wherein a related (second) patent cannot be
worked without infringing another’s already-existing (first) patent.124
An application filed under section 91 for a compulsory license to work a related
patent must meet the following two pre-conditions: first, that the applicant agrees
to grant to the (first) patentee a “cross-license” of the related (second) patent under
reasonable terms,125 and second, that the applicant’s patented invention (second
patent) has made a “substantial contribution to the establishment or development
of commercial or industrial activities” in India.126 Once both pre-conditions have
been met, the Controller of Patents may, at his discretion, grant a compulsory
license for the first patent, and also grant a cross-license for the related (second)

121.

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.

Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §§ 87(1)-87(2). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91,
rule 98(1) (providing that the patentee shall file his notice of opposition within two months from
the date on which the compulsory license application filed under section 84 is published in the official journal).
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 87(4). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule
98(5) (providing that the Controller of Patents shall give the licensee and the patentee no less
than ten days’ notice of hearing on a compulsory license application filed under section 84).
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(1).
Mueller, supra note 12, at 605.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(2)(i). See also Mueller, supra note 12, at 605 (using
the term “cross-license” in relation to the license granted to the (first) patentee to use the second
(related) patent owned by a compulsory license applicant under section 91 of the Patents Act of
1970).
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 91(2)(ii).
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patent, if such cross-license is requested by the first patentee.127 It is noteworthy
that both these pre-conditions, as stipulated in section 91(2) of the Patents Act of
1970, as well as the manner in which the Controller of Patents adjudicates upon
these pre-conditions under section 91(3) therein, are consistent with article 31(l)(i)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement.128 Notably, while an application seeking a
compulsory patent license under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970 can be
filed only after three years have expired from the date of the grant of the patent,129
section 91(1) does not create any such window period as it allows a compulsory
license application seeking to work a related (second) patent to be filed at any time
after the grant of the (first) patent.130 Further, while sections 84 and 91 may be at
variance with one another insofar as the window period for filing a compulsory
patent license application is concerned, both of these provisions find a common
ground in section 87 of the Patents Act of 1970. That is to say, the same
procedural mechanism laid down under section 87, which affords the patentee with
the opportunity to oppose compulsory license applications filed under section 84,131
is also followed in the case of compulsory license applications filed under section
91.132
c. To address cases of national emergency or extreme urgency, or for
purposes of a public non-commercial use (Section 92):

Section 92 of the Patents Act of 1970 provides that at any time after the grant of
a patent for a drug, if the Central (federal) Government in India officially declares
by way of a gazette notification that such patented drug is necessary to address a
circumstance of national emergency or an extreme urgency, or for purposes of
public non-commercial use, including a public health crisis relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics, the Controller of Patents shall, on an

127. See id. § 91(3). See also id. Proviso Clause to § 91(3) (“[T]he license granted by the Controller [of
Patents] shall be non-assignable except with the assignment of the respective patents.”).
128. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Mueller, supra note 12, at 606 n.653
(explaining that such consistency between section 91(2) of the Patents Act of 1970 and article 31(l)
of TRIPS Agreement “enable[s] innovators to adapt foreign inventions to local needs” (quoting
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing United States
Law and Practice with Options under the TRIPS Agreement, at 43, 46 (Paper presented to the
AALS Mid-Year Workshop on Intellectual Property, Vancouver, British Columbia, June 14-16,
2006)).
129. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 84(1).
130. Id. § 91(1).
131. See id. § 84 read with id. § 87 (1)-(4).
132. Section 91(4) of the Patents Act of 1970 allows patentees to oppose compulsory license applications
filed under section 91(1) by following the procedure laid out in section 87, which is the same
procedure followed by patentees while opposing compulsory license applications filed under
section 84. See id. § 91(4) read with id. § 87 (1)-(4).
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application made at any time after the government’s official notification, grant a
compulsory license for the patented drug,133 Notably, the grant of a compulsory
license under section 92 of the Patents Act of 1970 is consistent with article 31(b) of
the TRIPS Agreement read with paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration.134
It may be relevant to note that section 92 is titled as “Special Provision for
compulsory licenses on notifications by Central Government.”135 As explicit in this
title, a government notification is the immediate precursor to filing an application
seeking a compulsory license under section 92. Therefore, since the admissibility of
an application filed under section 92 is singularly premised on a government
notification declaring the need for a compulsory patent license to address a
national emergency or an extreme urgency or for purposes of a public noncommercial use, it can reasonably be inferred that the applicant filing such
application is dispensed with the requirement of making initial efforts towards
obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee.136 Notably, the waiver on the
requirement to make initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license, implicit
in section 92(1)(i) of the Patents Act of 1970, is consistent with the proviso clause to
section 84(6)(iv) therein,137 and is further consistent with article 31(b) of the TRIPS
Agreement.138
Although section 92 generally affords a patentee with the opportunity to oppose
an application seeking a compulsory license for his patented drug,139 the
opportunity for such an opposition is waived if the Controller of Patents is
convinced that a waiver is necessary to expedite the grant of the compulsory
license for addressing a circumstance of national emergency or an extreme
urgency, or a case of public non-commercial use, including a public health crisis
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, or other epidemics.140 While waiving
the patentee’s opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application filed under
133. See id. § 92(1)(i) read with § 92(3).
134. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, when read with
paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration, allows for the grant of a compulsory license to address a
national emergency or circumstances of extreme urgency, including a public health crisis relating
to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, or for purposes of a public noncommercial use).
135. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92.
136. See id. § 92(1)(i).
137. Id. Proviso Clause to § 84(6)(iv) (stating that the requirement of a compulsory license applicant
making initial efforts towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee “shall not be applicable in case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in case of public
non-commercial use . . .”).
138. See discussion supra Part III.A (enumerating the specific circumstances stated in article 31(b) of
the TRIPS Agreement, which obviate a compulsory license applicant from making initial efforts
towards obtaining a voluntary license from the patentee).
139. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92(2) read with §§ 87(1)-87(2).
140. See id. § 92(3).
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section 92, the Controller of Patents should inform the patentee, “as soon as may
be practicable,” of such waiver.”141 Further, while fixing the terms and conditions
of a compulsory license granted under section 92, the Controller of Patents shall
ensure that generic copies of the patented drug are “available to the public at the
lowest prices consistent with the patentees [sic] deriving a reasonable advantage
from their patent rights.142
d. To export a pharmaceutical patent to a country with insufficient
or no manufacturing capacity (Section 92A):

Section 92A was incorporated into the Patents Act of 1970 in the year 2005143 to
bring it in sync with paragraph 6 of the Implementation Decision that allows
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities to import generic copies
of patented drugs in the event of a public health crisis.144 Following the text of
paragraph 6 of the Implementation Decision, section 92A of the Patents Act of
1970 makes provision for the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug,
solely for manufacturing and exporting generic copies of such drug,145 to address
the public health problems of any country having insufficient or no manufacturing
capacity for the patented drug.146
As a procedural requirement, a compulsory license application for a patented
drug filed under section 92A may be allowed only if the country to which the export
is being made has also granted a compulsory license for such drug, or has, by
notification or otherwise, allowed the importation of such drug from India.147
However, section 92A is silent on the precise quantum of the generic copies of a
patented drug that a licensee is permitted to export through the means of a
compulsory license granted under section 92, which thus brings it at variance with
paragraph 2 of the Implementation Decision.148
It is noteworthy that section 92A is silent on whether a patentee must be
afforded the opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application filed under this
141. Id. Proviso Clause to § 92(3).
142. See id. § 92(1)(ii).
143. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
144. See Implementation Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 6.
145. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 92A(2).
146. Id. § 92A(1).
147. Id.
148. Compare Implementation Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 2, with Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, §
92A. See also supra note 88 and accompanying text (outlining the obligations imposed on both the
importing member as well as the exporting member, in terms of paragraph 2 of the
Implementation Decision, which include, among others, a mutual obligation vested in both
members to specify the names and expected quantities of the patented drug that the exporting
member, by means of a compulsory license, needs to manufacture and export to the importing
member with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such drug).
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provision, or otherwise be heard on the matter.149 The lack of such procedural
mechanism, consequently, vests the Controller of Patents with a “virtually
unfettered” discretion while deciding a section 92A compulsory license
application,150 thus bringing section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970 at variance
with the other provisions therein, viz. sections 84, 91 and 92, which allow the
patentee with an opportunity to oppose a compulsory license application.151
2. Terms and Conditions of a Compulsory Patent License
Just like in any standard contract, the issuance of a compulsory license for a
patented drug is subject to terms and conditions that are settled by the Controller
of Patents at the time of granting the compulsory patent license.152 These terms
and conditions, as stipulated in section 90(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, include,
inter alia, (i) that the licensee pays a reasonable sum of royalty and other
remuneration to the patentee,153 (ii) that the patented drug is worked to the fullest
extent by the licensee and with a reasonable profit to him,154 (iii) that the licensee
sells the patented drug for which the license is granted at a reasonably affordable
price,155 (iv) that the compulsory license is non-exclusive,156 (v) that the
compulsory license is non-assignable,157 and (vi) that the compulsory license is for
the balance term of the patented drug, “unless a shorter term is consistent with

149.
150.
151.
152.

153.

154.
155.
156.

157.

Mueller, supra note 12, at 602.
Id. at 601.
See id. at 602.
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 read with § 93 (“Any order for the grant of a
(compulsory) license shall operate as if it were a deed granting a license executed by the patentee
and all other necessary parties embodying the terms and conditions, if any, settled by the
Controller.”). For a quick reference of the precise terms and conditions under which a compulsory
patent license may be granted by the Controller of Patents under the Patents Act of 1970, see
infra Annexure I.B.
While determining the quantum of “royalty and other remuneration” payable to the patentee, the
Controller of Patents takes into consideration various relevant factors, viz. the nature of the
patented drug, the expenditure incurred by the patentee in manufacturing or developing the drug,
and the expenditure incurred by the patentee in obtaining a patent on the drug and for keeping
such patent in force. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(i).
See id. § 90 (1)(ii).
See id. § 90 (1)(iii).
Id. § 90 (1)(iv). See also Carlos M. Correa, Can the TRIPS Agreement Foster Technology Transfer
to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 227, 248-49 (Keith M. Maskus & Jerome
H. Reichman eds., 2005) (explaining the term “non-exclusive” to mean that “the patent owner can
continue to exploit . . . [his] invention and directly compete with the compulsory licensee,
leveraging the advantages conferred by technical knowledge and the prestige of brand names”).
Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(v). See also Correa, supra note 156, at 249 (explaining
the term “non-assignable” to mean that “[t]he patent owner . . . retains the right to grant any
voluntary licenses he wishes”).
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public interest.”158 Further, although a compulsory license for a patented drug is
granted with the predominant purpose of supplying to the domestic market in
India,159 section 90(1) stipulates that generic copies of such drug may be allowed to
be manufactured and exported to foreign markets under any of the following two
circumstances: first, if the “market for export of the patented [drug] manufactured
in India is not being supplied or developed;”160 or second, if “the [compulsory]
license is granted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative
process to be anti-competitive.161 Section 90(2) further stipulates that a compulsory
license for a patented drug, upon being granted by the Controller of Patents, “shall
[not] authorize the licensee to import the patented [drug] . . . or . . . [a drug] made
by a patented process from abroad where such importation would, but for such
authorization, constitute an infringement of the rights of the patentee.”162 That is
to say, the grant of a compulsory license for a patented drug shall not authorize the
licensee to import generic copies of the patented drug from a country that does not
have a compulsory license authorizing the export of generic copies of such drug.163
However, the Central (federal) Government may, where it is of the opinion that
public interest demands, direct the Controller of Patents to authorize the licensee
of a compulsory license, to import generic copies of a patented drug, regardless of
whether the country from which such import is being made has a compulsory
license authorizing the export of generic copies of such drug.164
Notably, while section 90(1) sets out the terms and conditions that must be
settled by the Controller of Patents specifically for granting a compulsory license to
prevent abuse of patent rights (under section 84),165 the same terms and conditions
also apply when a compulsory license is granted to work a related patent (under
section 91),166 and when a compulsory patent license is granted to address cases of
national emergency or extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public non-commercial
use (under section 92).167 It is, however, not clear if the terms and conditions of a

158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
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See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 90 (1)(vi).
See id. § 90(1)(vii).
See id. § 90(1)(vii) read with § 84(7)(a)(iii). Further, unlike section 90(1)(vii) read with section
84(7)(a)(iii) of the Patents Act of 1970, there is no analogous provisions in Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement that authorize generic drug manufacturers to export patented drugs in the event that
the domestic markets for the export of such drugs is not being developed. Compare TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 50, art. 31 (a)-(l), with Patents Act, 1970, supra note 39, § 90(1)(vii) read
with § 84(7)(a)(iii).
Id. § 90(1)(ix).
See id. § 90(2).
See id.
See id. 90(3).
Id. § 90(1).
Id. § 91 (4).
Id. § 92 (2). Additionally, when a compulsory license is granted in circumstances of national

Compulsory Patent Licensing in India, its Compliance with TRIPS, and Bayer v. Natco

compulsory patent license, as set out in section 90(1), would apply when the
Controller of Patents grants a compulsory license for a patented drug to enable
generic copies of such drug to be manufactured and exported to countries with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for the patented drug (under section
92A).168 Be that as it may, by making provision for compulsory patent licensing to
enable generic copies of a patented drug to be manufactured and exported to
foreign markets outside of India, section 92A effectively creates an exception to
section 90(1), which otherwise limits the use of a compulsory license for
predominantly supplying to the domestic market in India.169
It may be relevant to note that the terms and conditions of a compulsory license
for a patented drug, once settled by the Controller of Applicants at the time of the
grant of such license, are subject to a one-time revision under section 88(4) of the
Patents Act of 1970.170 As a procedural requirement, the licensee (holder of the
compulsory license), seeking the revision of the terms and conditions of a
compulsory license granted to him for a patented drug, should make an application
for revision to the Controller of Patents, provided that such application is made at
any time after the licensee has commercially worked the drug for at least twelve
months, and on the ground that terms and conditions initially settled have proved
to be so onerous that the he is unable to work the drug except at a loss.171
It may further be relevant to note that the Patents Act of 1970 does not
explicitly provide any statutory remedies, viz. damages, specific performance, etc.,
that may be available if and when the terms and conditions of a compulsory patent
license, as settled by the Controller of Patents at the time of its initial grant, are
breached or frustrated by either contracting party (the licensee or the patentee) to
such license. Notwithstanding the absence of specific provisions for remedying the
breach of a compulsory patent license, the Controller of Patents may, upon an
application made by a patentee or any person deriving title or interest in a patent,
terminate a compulsory patent license issued for the patent, “if and when the

168.
169.
170.
171.

emergency, extreme urgency, or for purposes of a public non-commercial use, the licensee shall
make the patented drug available to the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentee
deriving a reasonable advantage from his patent rights. Id. § 92 (1)(ii).
Section 92A is silent on whether a compulsory license granted under its provisions is subject to the
same terms and conditions, as set out in section 90, that apply to compulsory licenses granted under sections 84, 91 and 92, respectively, of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. § 92A.
See id. § 92A read with §§ 90(1)(vii),(ix).
See id. Proviso Clause to § 88(4).
See id. § 88(4). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule 101(1)-(4) (providing that a
licensee (holder of a compulsory license), whose application for a revision of the terms and
conditions of the compulsory license has been admitted by the Controller of Patents for
adjudication, shall serve a copy of such application to the patentee, who may file his notice of
opposition to such application within one month from the date of such service, and also serve a
copy of his notice of opposition to the licensee).
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circumstances that give rise to the grant [of such license] no longer exist and such
circumstances are unlikely to recur.”172 While deciding an application for the
termination of a compulsory patent license, the Controller of Patents shall ensure
that the licensee (holder of the compulsory license) is afforded the right to object to
such termination,173 and shall also take into account that such licensee’s interest is
not unduly prejudiced.174 Notably, the circumstances under which an application
seeking the termination of a compulsory patent license may be allowed, as outlined
in section 94(1) the Patents Act of 1970, are consistent with the circumstances
outlined in article 31(g) of the TRIPS Agreement.175
The legal validity of an order denying or granting a compulsory license for a
patented drug, including the reasonableness of the terms and conditions of such
license as settled by the Controller of Patents, may be challenged before the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) by way of an appeal,176 provided such
appeal is made within three months from the date on which the compulsory license
order is issued by the Controller of Patents, or within such further time as the
IPAB, in its discretion, may allow,177 subject to being “satisfied. . . that there . . .
172. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 94(1).
173. See id. Proviso Clause to § 94(1). See also Patents Rules of 2003, supra note 91, rule 102(2)-(3)
(providing that an applicant seeking the termination of a compulsory license shall serve a copy of
such application to the licensee (holder of the compulsory license), who may file his objection to
the application for termination within one month from the date of receipt of such application by
him, and also serve a copy of his objection to the applicant).
174. Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 94(2).
175. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that article 31(g) of the TRIPS Agreement allows the termination of a compulsory patent “if and when the circumstances which led to . . . [the issuance of
such license]cease to exist and are unlikely to recur”).
176. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 117A(2). Section 117A(2), while categorically stating that
an appeal shall lie to the IPAB against a compulsory license order issued under section 84 (to prevent the abuse of patent rights), or under section 91 (to work a related patent), or under section 92
(to address circumstances of national emergency or extreme urgency, or a case of public noncommercial use), does not mention whether an appeal shall also lie against any such order under
issued section 92A (to permit the manufacturing and export of generic copies of a patented drug to
countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity for such drug). This being the case, it can
reasonably be inferred that compulsory license orders issued by the Controller of Patents under
section 92A are final and non-appealable under the purview of the Patents Act of 1970. See id.
Further, the use of the expression “any decision, order of the Controller of Patents” in section
117A(2), by necessary implication, allows an applicant, who is otherwise successful in obtaining a
compulsory license, to appeal against any terms and conditions of the license, viz. a high quantum
of royalty fixed by the Controller of Patents, etc., that may appear unfair or onerous to him while
executing the compulsory license order at a reasonable profit. See id. Moreover, as an alternative
to filing an appeal, such applicant who is successful in obtaining a compulsory license for a patented invention, may exercise the option of subjecting the terms and conditions of the license to a
one-time revision by filing an application for revision to the Controller of Patents, provided that
such application is filed at any time after the applicant has commercially worked the drug for at
least twelve months, and on the ground that terms and conditions initially settled have proved to
be so onerous that the he is unable to work the drug except at a loss. Id. § 88(4).
177. Id. § 117A(4).
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[was] sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed time.”178
The decision of the IPAB, though final under the Patents Act of 1970,179 is subject
to judicial review under the Constitution of India.180 Notably, the provisions for
challenging a compulsory license order issued by the Controller of Patents—both
by way of an appeal to the IPAB under section 117A(2) of the Patents Act of 1970,
as well as by way of judicial review under the Constitution of India—are consistent
with articles 31(i) and 31(j) of the TRIPS Agreement.181

IV. Bayer v. Natco and its Reverberations: A Cult Classic of the
Big Daddy, the Underdog, the Mother Hen, and the
Scapegoats of Compulsory Patent Licensing in India
A. The Underdog Challenges the Status Quo: Procedural History of
Natco’s Compulsory License Application
Sorafenib Tosylate, the chemical name of a drug used in the treatment of
advanced hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC)182, advanced renal cell carcinoma
(RCC)183 and differentiated thyroid carcinoma (DTC),184 was invented by Bayer
HealthCare Pharmaceuticals (hereinafter “Bayer”) and Onyx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. (hereinafter “Onyx”) under mutual collaboration and co-promotion
178.
179.
180.

181.

182.
183.
184.

The Patents (Appeals and Applications to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board) Rules, 2011,
rule 3 (2011), notified in THE GAZETTE OF INDIA: EXTRAORDINARY, NOTIFICATION GSR NUMBER
209(E) 8, PART II-§ 3(i) (Mar. 11, 2011).
There is no provision for further appeal against a decision rendered by the IPAB under the
Patents Act of 1970. See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 117B.
The constitutional validity of a decision rendered by the IPAB under the Patents Act of 1970 can
be challenged by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the state High Courts under article 226 of the
Constitution of India. See INDIA CONST. (1950) art. 226. In similar vein, the IPAB’s decision can
also be challenged before the Supreme Court of India by invoking its writ jurisdiction under
article 32 of the Constitution of India. See INDIA CONST. (1950) art. 32. See also Harshad Pathak,
The Jurisdictional Dilemma Surrounding the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, 20 J. INTELL.
PROP. RTS. 51, 54 (2015) (arguing that the exercise of judicial review by the state high courts and
the Supreme Court, acting under their respective writ jurisdiction, is part of the “basic structure”
of Constitution of India, and therefore, a tribunal established under ordinary legislations, such as
the IPAB, cannot exercise its quasi-judicial or appellate functions in a manner so as to exclude the
writ jurisdiction of the state high courts and the Supreme Court of India).
See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that article 31(i) of the TRIPS Agreement, when read with
article 31(j) therein, states that “the decision of the competent authority, allowing or dismissing
the authorization of such use, including its decision on the quantum of remuneration payable to
the patentee, shall not be final but subject to judicial review by a higher authority”).
HCC, at its advanced stages, is a type of liver cancer that cannot be treated with surgery.
NEXAVAR®, http://www.nexavar-us.com/what-is-nexavar/?p=liver/ (select “What is NEXAVAR?”
hyperlink) (last visited June 30, 2015).
RCC, at its advanced stages, is a type of kidney cancer that cannot be treated with surgery. Id.
DTC is a type of progressing thyroid cancer that can no longer be treated with radioactive iodine.
Id.
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agreements.185 Bayer obtained the patent on Sorafenib Tosylate in India in 2008,
and since then has been marketing the drug within the country under its
worldwide brand name “Nexavar®.”186 Bayer has been selling the drug in India at
US $5,608 per month’s dose,187 which must be taken by the patient on a preventive
basis throughout his lifetime to increase his life expectancy.188
Finding Nexavar to be exorbitantly priced for the average Indian consumer but
therapeutically indispensable as a life-extending drug, Natco Pharma Ltd.
(hereinafter “Natco”), a leading Indian pharmaceutical company, approached
Bayer in 2010 for a voluntary license to manufacture and sell the drug in India.189
Though its negotiations with Bayer did not materialize, Natco was successful in
obtaining a regulatory approval in April 2011 from the Drug Controller General of
India for marketing the generic version of Nexavar in the country.190
185.

186.

187.
188.

189.
190.
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Therapies: Nexavar (Sorafenib) Tablets, ONYX PHARM., http://www.onyx.com/therapies/ nexavarsorafenib-tablets (section titled “Partner Status”) (last visited June 30, 2015) (“Onyx and Bayer
each fund 50 percent of the development costs for Nexavar worldwide, excluding Japan, where
Bayer funds all product development. Onyx and Bayer co-promote Nexavar in the U.S. and share
equally in any profits or losses. Outside of the U.S., Bayer has exclusive marketing rights and
Onyx and Bayer share profits 50/50 globally, excluding Japan, where Bayer paid Onyx a one-time
payment of $160 million in 2011, as part of its expanded collaboration agreement.”).
Bayer filed its patent application for Nexavar in the United States on January 13, 1999, and
followed it by filing its PCT International Application, bearing PCT/US00/000648, on January 12,
2000. On July 5, 2001, Bayer’s PCT application entered the national phase of registration in
India. Bayer received all requisite regulatory approvals for importing and marketing Nexavar in
India by January 2008, and finally a patent no. 215758 was granted to it on March 3, 2008. For a
chronological overview of when and how Bayer obtained the patent on Nexavar, first in the
United States and thereafter in India, see Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., C.L.A. No. 1 of
2011, Mar. 9, 2012 (Controller of Patents, Mumbai), pp 4-5 available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_ License_12032012.pdf (India.) [hereinafter, Natco
v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents)]. See also Varun Chhonkar, Nexavar: Compulsory
License Will Severely Impact Global Pharma Companies, PATENT CIRCLE (Aug. 10, 2011, 12:23
PM), http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2011/08 /nexavar-compulsory-license-will.html (last visited
June 30, 2015) (noting that there were no “pre-grant oppositions" filed against Bayer’s patent
application for Nexavar, and grant of the patent was published on March 28, 2008, which was
followed by a “one year window period for post-grant opposition” that ended on March 28, 2009).
SAVITA GAUTAM & MEGHNA DASGUPTA, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, COMPULSORY LICENSING: INDIA’S MAIDEN EXPERIENCE 8 (ARTNeT Working Paper
Series, No. 137, Nov. 2013, Bangkok), available at artnet.unescap.org/pub/wp13713.pdf.
See Naval Satarawala Chopra & Dinoo Muthappa, The Curious Case of Compulsory Licensing in
India,8 COMPETITION L. INT’L ¶ 5 (2012), available at http://awa2013.concurrences.com/businessarticles-awards/article/the-curious-case-of-compulsory (stating that “Nexavar is a life-enhancing
and not a life-saving drug . . . ”). See also Josep M. Llovet et al., Sorafenib in Advanced
Hepatocellular Carcinoma, 4 N. ENGL. J. MED. 378, 378-83 (2008), available at (documenting a
study conducted on 602 people suffering from inoperable liver cancer, wherein it was found that
patients who received sorafenib, also known as Nexavar, lived forty-four per cent longer than
those who did not receive Nexavar).
See Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 6 (documenting that
Natco had “proposed to sell the drug at a price of Rs. 8800/- for one month therapy” as compared
to Bayer’s price of about Rs. 2,80,428/-).
Id. at 5.
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In order to thwart the launching of the generic version of Nexavar in India,
Bayer arraigned Natco in a suit for patent infringement, which it filed in the High
Court of Delhi on June 5, 2011.191 As a counter-attack, Natco not only decided to
defend the patent infringement suit,192 but it went a step forward and filed an
application before the Controller of Patents in Bombay on July 28, 2011, seeking a
compulsory license to manufacture and market the generic version of Nexavar in
India under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970.193 Notably, notwithstanding
the pendency of Bayer’s patent infringement suit before the High Court of Delhi,
the Controller of Patents, by his order dated August 8, 2011, admitted Natco’s
compulsory license application for processing.194
Aggrieved, Bayer petitioned before the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi,
respectively, alleging that Natco’s compulsory license application had been
erroneously admitted by the Controller of Patents on a mere prima facie view of
the matter.195 This admissibility issue, however, was rejected first by the High
Court of Bombay, by its order dated November 11, 2011,196 and subsequently by
the High Court of Delhi, by its order dated November 16, 2011,197 thereby forcing
Bayer to withdraw its petitions from both the courts.
Having failed to prevent the processing of Natco’s compulsory license
application, Bayer was left with no choice but to contest the compulsory license
proceedings before the Controller of Patents. Bayer, thus, opposed Natco’s
application for a compulsory license on, inter alia, two key grounds: first, that
Natco did not take adequate steps to obtain a voluntary license from Bayer in
respect of Nexavar in terms of section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970,198 and
second, that although Nexavar was not being locally manufactured in India, Bayer

191.

192.
193.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., C.S. (O.S.) No. 1090/2011 (Delhi H.C.), available at
http://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=577484 [hereinafter, Bayer v.
Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court)]. As of June 30, 2015, this case
continues to be pending and all interlocutory orders passed so far in this matter can be referenced
via the official website of the High Court of Delhi.
The various interlocutory orders passed so far in Bayer Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., id., indicate
that Natco has been defending the patent infringement suit filed by Bayer since June 2011.
For accessing the officially published draft of Natco’s compulsory license application filed before
the Controller of Patents in Mumbai, see OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE at pp. 1334463 (Publication of the Patent Office, Issue No. 32/2011, Aug. 12, 2011), available at
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxzcGljeWlwZmlsZ
XN8Z3g6NDFlNjAxZDIyOTY0MjMyMg.
Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2011) W.P. No. 2194/2011, ¶ 4 (Bombay H.C.), available at
http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/adjournlist1.php.
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2011) W.P.(C) No. 8062/2011, ¶ 2 (Delhi H.C.), available at
http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=600210.
Natco v. Bayer (Decision of the Controller of Patents), supra note 186, at 9.

361

13 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2015)

had “worked” the drug on a commercial scale in the country by importing it from
contract manufacturers abroad.199 However, the Controller of Patents did not find
merit in Bayer’s opposition, reasoning that “mere importation cannot amount to
working of a patented invention.”200 Interpreting the expression “worked in the
territory of India,” as stated in section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act of 1970, to mean
“manufactured to a reasonable extent in India,”201 the Controller of Patents further
observed that Bayer had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why it
had failed to set up local manufacturing facilities for developing Nexavar in India
despite having held an Indian patent on the drug since 2008.202
Finally, accepting Natco’s contention that the reasonable requirements of the
public in India with respect to Nexavar had not been met203, and further, that the
drug had not been marketed in the country at a reasonably affordable price,204 the
Controller of Patents allowed the compulsory license application, thereby directing
Bayer to license the manufacturing of Nexavar to Natco for a royalty of 6% of the

199.
200.
201.

202.
203.

204.
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Id. at pp. 38-39.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43 -44 (“[A] combined reading of Section[s] 83(c) and (f) … [of the Patents Act, 1970] …”
makes it clear that “a patentee is obliged to contribute towards the transfer and dissemination of
technology … so as to balance the rights with the obligations. A patentee can achieve this by
either manufacturing the product in India or by granting a license to any other person for
manufacturing in India.”). It is further noteworthy that the Controller of Patents read articles
27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement together with articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention to
rationalize the legislative intent behind having “failure to work the patent” as a ground for
issuing compulsory license under section 84(1) (c) of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. at 41-42 (“When
the Article 27(1) of TRIPS Agreement is read with …. [articles 5(A)(1) and 5(A)(2)] of the Paris
Convention, it follows that importation of a patented invention shall not result in forfeiture of a
patent. However, a reasonable fetter on the patent rights in the form of a compulsory license is
very well within the purview of the Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement, when there is an
abuse of patent rights. It is this flexibility … [that has resulted in] the Parliament …
incorporating a provision [section 84(1)(c) of the Patents Act, 1970] for grant of compulsory license
upon [a patentee’s] failure to work the invention within the territory of India.”).
See id. at 45.
Id. at 20-24. During the course of the compulsory license proceedings, Bayer submitted before the
Controller of Patents that it had sold 593 boxes of Nexavar during 2011, though there was a
requirement of 2,700 boxes that year to cater to around 8,842 patients requiring the drug in India.
Based on these figures, the Controller estimated that Bayer did not supply Nexavar® to more
than 200 patients during 2011, which was only a little above 2% of the eligible patients, thereby
concluding that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the drug had not been
met in India in terms of §84(1)(a) of the Patents Act of 1970. Id. at 22.
Id. at 24-36. During the course of the compulsory license proceedings, Bayer argued that the
expression “reasonably affordable price,” as stated in §84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970, should
be construed not just in terms of the purchasing power of the public, but primarily in terms of the
cost incurred by the patentee on R&D. The Controller of Patents, however, rejected this
argument, stating that the expression “reasonably affordable price” must be construed
predominantly with reference to the public. Further, the fact that Bayer had not met the
reasonable requirements of the Indian public with respect to Nexavar could be explained on
account of the drug not being sold at a reasonably affordable price. Id. at 34-36.
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net sales of the drug payable on a quarterly basis.205
B. The Big Daddy Strikes Back: Bayer’s Appeal before the IPAB
Aggrieved by the decision of the Controller of Patents, Bayer appealed against
the compulsory license order issued by the Controller of Patents before the IPAB.
Pending the disposal of its appeal, Bayer filed an interlocutory petition for a
temporary stay on the compulsory license, which was dismissed by the IPAB on
September 14, 2012.206 On March 4, 2013, the IPAB dismissed Bayer’s appeal,
thus upholding the compulsory license granted by the Controller of Patents to
Natco for manufacturing and marketing the generic version of Nexavar in India.207
Bayer attacked the compulsory order of the Controller of Patents before the
IPAB by fielding a two-pronged appeal. The first prong of Bayer’s appeal
specifically alleged three procedural irregularities pertaining to the admissibility of
the compulsory license application, asserting that the Controller of Patents erred
in admitting the application. First, Bayer claimed that it was not given notice and
an opportunity to be heard as required by section 87(1) of the Patents Act of
1970.208 Second, the Controller of Patents allegedly erred by accepting that Natco
had undertaken the required reasonable steps under section 84(6)(iv) to seek a
voluntary license from Bayer for manufacturing and marketing Nexavar in
India.209 Third, Bayer claimed that the compulsory license application should have
been rejected for want of documentary evidence corroborating Natco’s interest in
being issued the compulsory license.210
The second prong of Bayer’s appeal specifically raised five issues on the
substance and merits of the impugned compulsory license order. First, in
ascertaining whether the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to
Nexavar had been met in India, the Controller of Patents allegedly erred by failing
to consider the supply of the generic version of the drug in the Indian market by
another drug manufacturer, Cipla, as well as by Bayer’s self-sponsored Patient
Assistance Programme (PAP).211 Second, Bayer asserted that in determining
whether Nexavar was reasonably affordable to the general public in India, the

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 60-61.
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, M.P. Nos. 74 to 76/2012 & 108/2012, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM,
Sept. 14, 2012 (IPAB, Chennai).
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. 45 of 2013, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, Mar. 4, 2013 (IPAB,
Chennai), available at http://www.ipabindia.in/Pdfs/Order-45-2013.pdf [hereinafter Bayer v.
Natco (Decision of the IPAB, Chennai)].
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
See id. 4.
Id. at 4-5.
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Controller of Patents erred by failing to take into account the cost of R&D incurred
by Bayer in manufacturing the drug.212 Third, given that Nexavar—a palliative
drug with a relatively small patient base—required a longer time to make inroads
into the Indian pharmaceutical market, Bayer alleged that it was unfairly denied
adjournment or extension of time by the Controller of Patents to work the drug to
its fullest extent in India.213 Fourth, Bayer asserted that contrary to the Controller
of Patents’ holding, local manufacturing of Nexavar was not necessary for the drug
to have been “worked in the territory of India” under section 84(1)(c) of the Patents
Act of 1970.214 And fifth, Bayer contended that the Controller of Patents
arbitrarily exercised his discretionary power, vested in him under section 90 of the
Patents Act of 1970, by fixing the terms and conditions of the compulsory license,
particularly with respect to the sum of royalty that Natco was directed to pay to
Bayer.215
C. The Mother Hen Prevails: Decision of the IPAB
The IPAB, in a well-reasoned order dated March 4, 2013, dismissed Bayer’s
appeal of the compulsory license order.216 In the first leg of its decision, the IPAB
rejected Bayer’s challenge to the compulsory license order on procedural issues,
reasoning that—first, as no final determination of rights could be contemplated at
the initial stage of admitting Natco compulsory license application, the Controller
of Patents was required to make only a prima facie consideration of the matter in
terms of section 87(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, which further dispensed him with
the obligation to provide Bayer any notice or an opportunity to be heard;217 second,
a letter from Natco to Bayer dated December 6, 2010, and Bayer’s response dated
December 27, 2010, appropriately suggested that Natco had made a genuine,
though failed, effort at securing a voluntary license from Bayer as required by
84(6)(iv);218 and third, given that the Controller of Patents had all necessary
evidence on record before it decided the compulsory license application on its
merits and that Bayer had been duly apprised of such evidence, it could not be said
that Natco had lapsed in filing documentary evidence along with its application

212.
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215.
216.
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See id. at 8-9.
See id. at 4.
Id.
See id.at 5.
Id.
See id. at 5-7. Moreover, given that Bayer participated in all proceedings subsequent to filing its
opposition to the compulsory license application, ipso facto, estopped it from challenging the
compulsory license order for want of notice or an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 5-6.
Id. at 7-10.
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under section 84(3) of the Patents Act of 1970.219 In the second leg of its decision,
the IPAB rejected Bayer’s challenge to the merits of the compulsory license order,
reasoning that—first, as Bayer had admittedly never licensed Cipla to
manufacture the generic version of Nexavar, the latter’s sales of the drug on the
Indian market could not be factored in to determine whether or not the reasonable
requirements of the public had been met under section 84(1)(a);220 second, Bayer’s
sale of the drug in India at US $5,500 per month’s dose could not be considered
reasonably affordable to the public under section 84(1)(b);221 third, despite
managing to secure a patent on Nexavar four years prior to the filing of the
compulsory license application, the lack of promptitude on Bayer’s part in taking
reasonable steps to work its patent in India provided a justified reason to the
Controller of Patents to deny adjournment under section 86 of the Patents Act of
1970;222 and fourth, though the expression “worked in the territory of India,” as
stated in section 84(1)(c), could be satisfied solely by importing the patented
invention, Bayer had failed to provide a reasonable explanation as to why it could
not locally manufacture Nexavar in India despite having held an Indian patent on
the drug since 2008.223 Although Bayer lost its appeal of the compulsory license
order on all counts, it managed to successfully convince the IPAB to increase the
rate of royalty that had been fixed by the Controller of Patents by one per cent.224
219.
220.

221.
222.
223.

224.

Id. at 11 (“[I]f there is any lapse [on Natco’s part in not filing any documentary evidence], it is a
procedural lapse [and] on that ground, the order cannot be set aside.”).
See id. at 17. See also Prashant Reddy, Bayer Sues Cipla for Infringement of its Nexavar
Patent – C.S. (O.S.) No. 523 of 2010 before the High Court of Delhi, SPICY IP INDIA (Apr. 18,
2010, 4:24 PM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/04/bayer-sues-cipla-for-infringementof.html (last visited May 30, 2013) (explaining that on March 23, 2010, Bayer filed a patent
infringement suit against Cipla, (Bayer Corp. v. Cipla Ltd., C.S. (O.S.) No. 523/2010), which
as of April 12, 2013, is pending final disposal before the High Court of Delhi). It is interesting
that while Bayer has been fighting tooth and nail to restrain Cipla from manufacturing the
generic version of Nexavar in India, it pleaded with the IPAB to consider Cipla’s sales of the
drug as a relevant factor in ascertaining whether or not the reasonable requirements of public
had been met in accordance with §84(1)(a) of the Patents Act of 1970. The IPAB, however,
rejected this plea, reasoning that Bayer, on account of being the patentee, could not shift the
burden of its patent meeting the reasonable requirements of the public to a third party. See
Bayer v. Natco (Decision of the IPAB, Chennai), supra note 207, at 23 (“The law is clear that,
the requirements and conditions, for grant of compulsory license must be decided with
reference to the patentee alone and not a party whose presence itself is litigious. . . .
Therefore, for deciding whether the conditions of section 84 are satisfied, we will not take into
account the presence of Cipla.”).
See id. at 37-38.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 43 (“[W]ith regard to section 84(1)(c) [of the Patents Act, 1970], we find that the word
‘worked’ must be decided on a case to case basis and it may be proved in a given case, that
‘working’ can be done only by way of import, but that cannot apply to all other cases. The
patentee must show why [the patent] could not be locally manufactured. A mere statement to
that effect is not sufficient there must be evidence.”).
Id. at 44-45 (“[The] UNDP specifically recommends that the rate of royalty be set at 4% and
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D. The Scapegoats Rejoice: Subsequent History of the IPAB’s
Decision, its Aftermath in India and the International World,
and Options Before Bayer
With all its options exhausted under the purview of the Patents Act of 1970,
Bayer challenged the reasonableness of the IPAB’s decision by invoking the writ
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under article 226 of the Constitution of
India.225 On July 15, 2014, a division bench of the Bombay High Court refused to
interfere with the decision of the IPAB, thus upholding the compulsory license
granted by the Controller of Patents in Mumbai to Natco for manufacturing and
marketing generic copies of Nexavar.226 Bayer, thereafter, filed a special leave
petition before the Supreme Court of India, challenging the Bombay High Court’s
dismissal of its case.227 On December 12, 2014, dismissed the special leave petition
filed by Bayer, Stating that it was not “inclined to interfere”, the Supreme Court of
India dismissed the special leave petition filed by Bayer, with a caveat that all
questions of law in the matter shall remain open.228
This issuance of the compulsory license to Natco for manufacturing and
marketing generic copies of Bayer’s Nexavar marks a new milestone in the realm
of compulsory patent licensing of pharmaceutical patents in India.229 While
patentee drug manufacturers are decrying the decision,230 generic drug
manufacturers and support groups representing civil society have hailed the
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adjusted upwards as much as 2% for products of particular therapeutic value or reduced as
much as 2% when the development of the product has been partly supported with public funds
. . . . [Given that the manufacturing and marketing of Nexavar was wholly a privately-funded
initiative, the IPAB reasoned that Bayer had] a genuine reason for revision of royalty. . . .
[Accordingly, the royalty that had been fixed by the Controller of Patents at 6% of the net
sales of the drug on a quarterly basis was] increase[d] [by] one percent.”).
Bayer v. Natco (Decision of the Bombay High Court), supra note 115, at 2.
Id. at 52.
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 30145 / 2014, Dec. 12,
2014, 1 (Supreme Court of India).
Id.
See Shamnad Basheer, Compulsory Licensing is Not a Bad Word, SPICY IP INDIA (Mar. 5,
2013, 11:59 AM), http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2013/03/compulsory-licensing-is-not-badword.html (last visited June 30, 2015).
See, e.g.,U.S.-India Trade Relations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, Trade
Subcomm., 2013 Leg., 113th Sess. 7 (2013) (written testimony of Roy F. Waldron, Chief IP
Counsel, Pfizer, Inc.), (“Compulsory licenses are intended for use in extraordinary situations of
extreme urgency or other national emergency to meet the legitimate needs of the public. Often,
however, compulsory licenses may be used by competitors as a means to obtain authorization to
use or ttransfer technology developed by others without having to pay the substantial costs
associated with developing and testing the product. These copiers want to obtain a free ride or use
the technology at a much-reduced cost. Also, compulsory licenses are inappropriately viewed by
some governments as part of their industrial policy to establish domestic production or to reduce
government expenditures for medicines.”).
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compulsory license decision as a breakthrough in affordable and equitable
healthcare in India.231
The decision in Bayer v. Natco has not been well-received by the United
States and the European Union, who view India’s compulsory license provisions as
an impediment to foreign investments and a roadblock to effective trade
negotiations.232 Perceiving compulsory licensing as a threat to pharmaceutical
innovation, nations like the United States have the option of imposing trade
sanctions in its trade agreements with India,233 or challenging India’s compulsory
license provisions before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.234
Having fought and lost its case up to the highest dispute settlement forums in
India, what now are the options available to Bayer? There is a provision under the
Patents Act of 1970 whereby Bayer, upon the expiration of two years from the date
of the compulsory order, can apply for revocation of the order if Natco fails to work
the generic version of Nexavar in India.235 It may be relevant to recall here that
Bayer has been fighting a patent infringement claim against Natco at the High
Court of Delhi.236 Ordinarily, the compulsory license issued to Natco in respect of
Nexavar should, ipso facto, render Bayer’s patent infringement suit infructuous.
However, in its order dated May 31, 2013, the High Court of Delhi allowed Bayer
to persist its patent infringement claim because the claim was filed before Natco
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232.

233.
234.
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236.

See, e.g., Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s First Compulsory License Upheld, But Legal Fights Likely
to Continue, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/04/indias-firstcompulsory-licence-upheld-but-legal-fights-likely-to-continue/ (last visited Dec. 25, 2013)
(“[C]ompulsory licenses will be on the rise all over the world because it is the middle path between
extreme patent protectionism and patent abolitionism.”).
See Sukanya Narain, The NATCO Decision: Bringing Into the Indian Patent Practice The TRIPS
Flexibility of Compulsory Licensing, 10 (Apr. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript, National Law
University, Jodhpur), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2072435
(reporting the Special 301 comments to the US Trade Representative with regards to the
compulsory licensing provisions in India’s Patents Act, whereby the recommendation of
eliminating price as a trigger for issuing compulsory license under Section 84(1)(b) in order to
comply with TRIPS, has been proposed).
Reichman, supra note 26, at 259 (2009) (“A risk that the patentees’ governments will retaliate
with trade sanctions that could ‘cripple the economy of the licensing nation.’”).
International IP Enforcement: Protecting Patents, Trade Secrets and Market Access: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and
the Internet, 2012 Leg., 112th Sess. 2 (June 27, 2012) (statement of Teresa Stanek Rea,
Deputy Director, USPTO), available at http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/
collection/p266901coll4/id/4117 (observing that bringing a WTO case against India’s
compulsory licensing provisions is one of the tools available to the USPTO that should be
considered).
See Patents Act of 1970, supra note 39, § 85.
Bayer v. Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court), supra note 191. As of
June 30, 2015, this case continues to be pending and all interlocutory orders passed so far in this
matter can be referenced via the official website of the High Court of Delhi.
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filed its compulsory license application.237 Therefore, if Bayer eventually wins its
patent infringement claim against Natco, it may become entitled to damages to the
extent of injury suffered before the compulsory license was issued.
Albeit the decision in Bayer v. Natco can rightfully be characterized as one
resulting in the issuance of India’s first compulsory license for a patented drug,
this case was not the first time that compulsory patent licensing provisions were
invoked under the Patents Act of 1970.238 Before Natco filed its compulsory license
application in 2011, three compulsory patent license applications for
pharmaceutical drugs had already been filed in India. Two of these were filed by
Natco in 2007 under section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970, seeking compulsory
licenses for F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd.’s Tarceva® and Pfizer, Inc.’s SUTENT®,
respectively, to manufacture and export the generic copies of these drugs to Nepal
in order to address the country’s health crisis.239 Natco reportedly withdrew both
its compulsory license applications in 2008, reasoning that the procedure under
section 92A of the Patents Act of 1970 was too cumbersome.240 Aside from these
two applications, a third compulsory license application was filed by Cipla Ltd. in
2011 for a compulsory license for Merck Sharp and Dohme’s ISENTRESS®,
invoking section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970.241 Soon thereafter, BDR
Pharmaceuticals International Pvt. Ltd. (BDR) filed a compulsory license
application in March 2013, under section 84(1) of the Patents Act of 1970, seeking
a compulsory license for Bristol-Myers Squibb’s SPRYCEL®, though this
application was eventually rejected for want of procedural compliance.242 On April
9, 2013, the Indian government announced its proposal to issue a compulsory
license for three life-saving drugs.243 More recently, on June 25, 2015, Lee Pharma
237.
238.
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240.
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Bayer v. Natco (Patent Infringement Suite Before the Delhi High Court), supra note 191, May 30,
2012, available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=121113&yr=2012.
For a summary status report on compulsory license applications for patented drugs, which have
been filed in India until June 30, 2015, see infra Annexure II.
Shamnad Basheer, India’s First “Doha” Case: Natco, Pfizer and Roche Will Be Heard Soon, SPICY
IP INDIA (Feb. 24, 2008), http://spicyip.com/2008/02/indias-first-doha-case-natco-pfizer-and.html
(last visited June 30, 2015).
Shamnad Basheer, Breaking News: Natco Withdraws “Doha” Compulsory License Application,
SPICY IP INDIA (Sept. 28, 2008), http://spicyip.com/2008/09/breaking-news-natco-withdrawsdoha.html (last visited June 30, 2015).
Rajiv Kr. Choudhry, Cipla Files for a Compulsory License Against Merck’s Isentress, SPICY IP
INDIA (Apr. 5, 2011), http://spicyip.com/2011/04/cipla-files-for-compulsory-license.html (last visited
June 30, 2015). On February 20, 2014, Mark Sharp and Dohme and Cipla announced that they
had entered an “India-Specific Strategic Partnership, whereby Cipla would have a non-exclusive
license to market MSD’s ISENTRESS® under a different trade name in India. See Aditi Tandon,
Health Activists Concerned Over Cipla-Merck Deal for HIV Drug, THE TRIBUNE (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140222/biz.htm#1 (last visited June 30, 2015).
BDR Pharma. Intl. Pvt. Ltd. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., C.L.A. No. 1 of 2013, Oct. 29, 2013
(Controller of Patents, Mumbai).
See Thomas Bolloky, Why Chemotherapy that Costs $70,000 in the U.S. Costs $2,500 in India,
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Ltd. filed an application seeking a compulsory license for AsreaZeneca’s Onglyza®
under section 84(1)(b) of the Patents Act of 1970, which was admitted for
processing and is currently pending before the Controller of Patents in Mumbai.244

V. Conclusion: Carving a Middle Path for all Divergent
Stakeholders of Compulsory Patent Licensing
Given the inequitable access to healthcare in India, the government in India
must strive towards the effective implementation of compulsory patent licensing of
drugs throughout its territory. Towards this end, a few strategies for the
enforcement of compulsory patent licensing, that would also result in facilitating
public access to expensively priced branded drugs, are elucidated in the
paragraphs that follow.
A. Ironing Out the Ambiguities in the Compulsory Licensing
Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement
Although article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement provides a prototype framework for
the enforcement of compulsory licensing provisions, it contains provisions that
have not been defined, thus creating a scope for potential patent abuses resulting
from the ambiguity inherent in these terms. The necessity of defining these terms
further stems from the fact that a compulsory license agreement, being essentially
an imposed contract, cannot be effectively enforced until its various terms and
conditions are precisely defined. For instance, the expressions “public commercial
non-use” has neither been defined in the TRIPS Agreement nor in the Doha
Declaration.245 It may be relevant to note that section 92 of the Patents Act also
does not define or explain what may be construed as a “national emergency,”
“extreme urgency,” or “public non-commercial use,” thus leaving the door open for
a compulsory patent license potentially being granted without basis or by abusing
the rights of a patentee.246

THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/archive/2013/04/WhyChemotherapy-that-Costs-70,000-in-the-US--Costs-2,500-in-India/274847/ (last visited Dec. 25,
2013). The proposal recommends compulsory licensing of three drugs—Trastuzumab, Ixabepilone,
and Dasatinib—sold by multinational pharmaceuticals in India. While Trastuzumab is a patented
drug of F. Hoffman La-Roche Ltd., the patent on Ixabepilone and Dasatinib is held by BristolMyers Squibb. Id.
244. Balaji Subramanian, Compulsory License Application Filed Over AstraZeneca’s Saxagliptin, SPICY
IP INDIA (July 5, 2015), http://spicyip.com/2015/07/compulsory-licence-application-filed-overastrazenecas-saxagliptin.html (last visited July 12, 2015).
245. Jamie Feldman, Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current Practice, 8 J. INT. BUS. L.,
137, 164 (2009).
246. See Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses Public Health
Concerns in Developing Nations, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS., 357, 360 (2010), available at
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B. Balancing the Equities Between Generic and Patented Drug
Manufacturers
The most effective way to ensure that the equities between the generic and
patented drug manufacturers are balanced is by paying due allegiance to
procedural propriety in the enforcement of compulsory patent licensing. The
enforcement process for compulsory patent licensing must neither be overly
adversarial, nor too expensive to administer.247 It should be administered in a
manner that ensures that the terms and conditions of the license are amicably
agreed upon and effectively complied with by the parties involved in the license.
The government should take steps towards setting up “a relatively predictable and
easy to administer” system of compensation or royalty payable to the patentee
drug manufacturer.248 This can be achieved, for instance, by having in place
precise guidelines or methodologies to determine the quantum or rate of royalty
payable to the licensee and the manner in which it is to be paid. Moreover, the
Controller of Patents should exercise his discretionary powers with reason and
rationale while enforcing compulsory licensing provisions. He should ensure that
the compulsory license proceeding are conducted fairly and expeditiously, and that
generic drug manufacturer adheres to all procedural stipulations when filing the
compulsory patent licensing application.

http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/10211/1/JIPR%2015%285%29%20357-363.pdf (asserting that the absence of a precise definitions of “national emergency,” “extreme urgency,” and
“public non-commercial use” in the TRIPS Agreement has resulted in national legislations (such
as the Patents Act of 1970) deciding the degree of flexibility in the conditions for invoking compulsory licensing).
247. See James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, Access
to Medicines and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord, THIRD WORLD NETWORK 1, 29 (2004).
248. Id.
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ANNEXURE I249
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY SHEET
OF
COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING PROVISIONS
UNDER
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE PATENTS ACT OF 1970
A. Grounds for Enforcement of a Compulsory Patent License:
Grounds

The
TRIPS
Agreement

The
Patents Act, 1970

1.

The reasonable requirements of the
public with respect to the patented
invention have not been satisfied

____

§ 84(1)(a) read with
§ 84(4) &
§ 84(7)(a)-(e)

2.

The patented invention is not
publicly available at a reasonably
affordable price

Serial
No.

3.

The patented invention has been
worked in the territory of India

____

____

§ 84(1)(b) read with
§ 84(4)
§ 84(1)(c) read with
§ 84(4), § 84(7)(d)
& § 84(7)(e)

4.

For working a related patent

Art. 31(l)(i)-(iii)

§ 91

5.

There is a national emergency

Art. 31(b) read with
¶ 5(c) of the Doha
Declaration

§ 92

6.

There is an extreme urgency

Art. 31(b) read with
¶ 5(c) of the Doha
Declaration

§ 92

7.

For purposes of a public noncommercial use

Art. 31(b)

§ 92

8.

For remedying an anti-competitive
practice adopted by the patentee

Art. 31(k)

Proviso Clause to
§ 84(6)(iv) &
§ 90(1)(ix)

9.

For allowing generic copies of a
patented drug to be exported to
countries with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities during a
public health crisis

¶ 6 of the
Implementation
Decision

249.

§ 92A

Annexure I supplements Part III of this paper by providing a comparative summary sheet of the
statutory provisions concerning the enforcement of compulsory patent licensing under the TRIPS
Agreement and the Patents Act of 1970, respectively. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
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B. Terms and Conditions of a Compulsory Patent License:
Serial
No.

Terms and Conditions

The
TRIPS
Agreement

The Patents
Act, 1970

1.

A compulsory license must be non-exclusive

Art. 31(d)

§ 90(1)(iv)

2.

A compulsory license must be non-assignable

Art. 31(e)

§ 90(1)(v)

3.

The licensee must pay royalty to the patentee
as settled by the competent authority

Art. 31(h)

§ 90(1)(i)

4.

The licensee must fully work the patent at a
reasonable profit

_____

§ 90(1)(ii)

5.

The licensee must sell generic copies of the
patented invention at affordable prices

_____

§ 90(1)(iii)

6.

If a compulsory license is granted specially to
address a national emergency or an extreme
urgency, or for a public non-commercial use,
the licensee must sell generic copies of the
patented invention at the lowest prices

_____

§ 92(1)(ii)

7.

The licensee must predominantly supply
generic copies of the patented invention to his
domestic market, with the exception to export
such generic copies in three circumstances:

(a) Art. 31(f) read
with Art. 31(k)

(a) to remedy an anti-competitive practice
(b) to address a public health crisis
(c) if the domestic market for export is not
being developed

(b) Art. 31 (f) read
with ¶ 6 of the
Implementation
Agreement
(c) [no provision
in the TRIPS
Agreement]

(a) §90(1)(ix)
(b) § 92A
(c) § 90(1)(vii)
read with
§84(7)(a)(iii)

§ 90(1)(viii)

9.

The scope and duration of a compulsory
license must be limited to the purpose behind
its grant, especially in the case of semiconductor technology, where such license
must be used only for a public non-commercial
use or to remedy an anti-competitive practice

10.

A compulsory license must be valid for the
balance term of the patent, unless a shorter
term is in public interest

_____

11.

A compulsory license must be terminated if
and when the circumstances which led to its
grant cease to exist and are unlikely to recur

Art. 31(g)

_____

12.

The licensee must not import the patented
invention from a country that does not have a
compulsory license authorizing the export of
such invention

_____

§ 90(2)
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ANNEXURE II250
SUMMARY STATUS REPORT
ON
COMPULSORY LICENSE APPLICATIONS FOR PATENTED DRUGS
UNDER THE PATENTS ACT OF 1970
(As on June 30, 2015)
Serial
No.
1.

Drug
&
Therapeutic Use
Chemical Name:
Erlonitib
Hydrochloride

Patentee:
F. Hoffmann LaRoche Ltd.

Brand Name:
Tarceva®

Applicant:
Natco Pharma
Ltd.

Therapeutic Use:
Treats advanced stage
non-small cell lung
cancer (NSCLC)

2.

Chemical Name:
Sunitinib Malate

Patentee:
Pfizer, Inc.

Brand Name:
SUTENT®

Applicant:
Natco Pharma
Ltd.

Therapeutic Use:
Treats gastrointestinal
stromal tumor (GIST),
advanced renal cell
carcinoma (RCC), and
advanced pancreatic
neuroendocrine tumor
(pNET)

250.

Parties

Ground(s)
For export to
Nepal to
address the
country’s
health crisis
[§ 92A]

For export to
Nepal to
address the
country’s
health crisis
[§ 92A]

Year of Filing
&
Current Status
Year of Filing:
2007
Current Status:

Withdrawn in
2008, as Natco
claimed the
procedure under
§ 92A to be too
cumbersome

Year of Filing:
2007
Current
Status:
Withdrawn in
2008, as Natco
claimed the
procedure under
§ 92A to be too
cumbersome

Annexure II supplements Part IV.D of this paper by consolidating the information pertaining to
the current status of all compulsory license applications for patented drugs filed so far under the
Patents Act of 1970. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
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Serial
No.
3.

Drug
&
Therapeutic Use
Chemical Name:
Raltegravir Potassium
Brand Name:
ISENTRESS®
Therapeutic Use:
Treats HIV infection
that causes AIDS

4.

Chemical Name:
Sorafenib Tosylate
Brand Name:
Nexavar®
Therapeutic Use:
Treats advanced
hepatocellular
carcinoma (HCC),
advanced renal
carcinoma (RCC), and
differentiated thyroid
carcinoma (DTC)

5.

Chemical Name:
Dasatinib
Brand Name:
SPRYCEL®
Therapeutic Use:
Treats chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML)

6.

Chemical Name:
Saxagliptin
Brand Name:
Onglyza® &
Kombiglyze® XR
(Combination of
Saxagliptin &
Metaphormin HCL)
Therapeutic Use:
Type II Diabetes
Mellitus

374

Parties

Ground(s)

Applicant:
Cipla Ltd.

The drug
was not
affordably
priced
[§ 84(1)(b)]

Patentee:
Bayer
Corporation

Abuse of
Patent
Rights

Applicant:
Natco Pharma
Ltd.

[§ 84(1)]

Patentee:
Bristol-Myers
Squibb

The drug
was not
affordably
priced

Patentee:
Merck Sharp &
Dohme (MSD)

Applicant:
BDR
Pharmaceuticals
(P) Ltd. (BDR)

Patentee:
Bristol-Myers
Squibb (Original
Patentee)
AstraZeneca plc
(Transferee of the
Patent)
Applicant:
Lee Pharma Ltd.

[§ 84(1)(b)]

The drug
was not
affordably
priced
[§ 84(1)(b)]

Year of Filing
&
Current Status
Year of Filing:
2011
Current
Status:
Withdrawn in
2014, as MSD
and Cipla
brokered a deal
Year of Filing:
2011
Current
Status:
Granted in 2012,
[Order of grant
upheld by the
IPAB in 2013,
and
subsequently by
the Bombay
High Court in
2014]
Year of Filing:
2013
Current Status:

Rejected in 2013,
as BDR did not
take steps in
obtaining a
voluntary license
from the
patentee
Year of Filing:
2015
Current
Status:
Pending

